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IIntroduction
1 Background
Elections and public opinion surveys on the political actors success are part
of democratic life. In elections, aim is to pick the most suitable candidate
to govern in the future. In the public opinion polls, respondents reßect
their experiences of the political actors policies and actions so far. In both
cases, individual citizen is given a chance to express her/his opinion. In
both occasions, the outcome can be simpliÞed to phrases like either-or, for-
or-against, 0-or-1.
There have been several diﬀerent attempts to understand and interpret
forces swinging the decision from 0 to 1 and vice versa. This trivial seeming
outcome can be traced to have been inßuenced by social, economic and
political contexts. In this dissertation, the economic context is the main
focus, but we will not forget the social nor the political context as we proceed
to the last chapter.
The Þrst to theoretically emphasize the economic context was Anthony
Downs with his inßuential work Economic Theory of Democracy (1957),
which binds self-interest and rationality to the study of human political
activities. Downs connects abstaining from voting and choice of candidate.
A central role is given to so-called party diﬀerential obtained by subtracting
expected utility supplied by opposition from expected utility supplied by
incumbent. In calculating the expected party diﬀerential the voter uses the
incumbents past performance as an indicator of the future. The expected
utility provided by the opposition is determined as policy measures it would
have taken, had it been the incumbent. If the result of this diﬀerence is
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zero, then it is rational to abstain from voting. If it is positive, then it is
rational to vote for the incumbent, but otherwise the opposition. In addition,
abstaining is rational if the information gathering costs exceed the utility
from voting. If the decision has to be made between several parties, the
Downsian choice is the most preferred party. But in the case that the most
preferred party has no chance to win, then the choice is to vote against the
least preferred party.
Each incumbent wishes to get reelected and its policies are designed
to further that desire. Thus, it is straightforward to hold each incumbent
accountable for the economic policy and economic outcomes in its period.
The voters punish (reward) the incumbent for bad (good) economic develop-
ment by voting against (for) it. Downs named this pattern as responsibility
hypothesis1.
Downs assumes that parties have identical preferences on the economic
outcomes. Hibbs (1977) was the Þrst to connect the trade-oﬀ between un-
employment and inßation to the trade-oﬀ between left-wing and right-wing
parties. This assumption transformed the responsibility hypothesis to ei-
ther partisan hypothesis, also known as clientele hypothesis (Hibbs, 1987,
Swank, 1993), or salient goal hypothesis (Powell and Whitten, 1993). Ac-
cording to the partisan hypothesis left-wing (right-wing) voters are more
likely to be hurt by unemployment (inßation), which places the lowering
of unemployment (inßation) to left-wing (right-wing) parties top priorities.
Thus, high and/or increasing unemployment (inßation) raises support for
left-wing (right-wing) parties. The support decision in the salient goal hy-
pothesis is just the opposite to the partisan hypothesis. According to the
salient goal hypothesis each party is held more accountable for the develop-
ment of its salient goal. Hence, left-wing (right-wing) incumbent is evaluated
1The same line of thought applies to the poll respondents behavior. In polls, the
incumbent seeks the highest possible approval for its policies. High approval is also a
signal to the political rivals.
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by its success with handling the unemployment (inflation).
Kramer (1971), Mueller (1971) and Goodhard and Bhansali (1970) were
the first to capture this multidimensional phenomenon into a simple sta-
tistical relationship. The diﬀerent hypotheses conditioning the incumbent’s
poll success to its economic success can be subjected to empirical testing
using so-called popularity function. Existence and strength of economic ap-
proval can be empirically tested in two ways. The first involves national
aggregate variables on both sides of the estimation equation. The second
applies individual-level survey data with information on the respondent’s
background and reporting of her/his own economy and her/his perceptions
of the national economy. When applied to either of the data sets, the pop-
ularity function tells the economic variables, political and other events that
shake public opinion. Aggregate data allows taking account of the passing
of time and studying the diﬀerences between long-term and short-term re-
lationships between the popularity series and the explanatory variables. In
addition, it allows the researcher to find out about trends, cycles and shocks
and their persistence in popularity series. Applying the individual-level
data gives information on whether one’s socioeconomic and demographic
background matters for the approval behavior. Major benefit of using the
individual-level data is avoiding problem of ecological inference. Namely,
often the interpretation of the aggregate results involves an aim to infer the
underlying individual behavior.
Standard linear formulation of the popularity function in aggregate form2
is as follows
Pt = β0 + β1Pt−1 +
Pn
i=1 β2iEit +
Pk
i=1 β3iXit +
Pp
i=1 β4iTit + t,
where Pt is the poll share of government or the party at time t, the first
variable on the right hand side is its lagged value (Pt−1). Eit stands
2Respective disaggregate form is as follows: Pi,t = β0+βt+β1Pi,t−1+β2Ei,t+β3Xi,t+
i,t, where i refers to individual, E to economic variables and X to socio-demographic
variables.
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for independent economic variables. The included economic variables have
to have a direct eﬀect on the citizens well-being and have to be clearly
noticeable via media or personal experience. The most often tested economic
arguments are unemployment, inßation and incomes3. Xit includes political
variables, which highlight signiÞcance of atypical events concerning internal
or foreign aﬀairs4. Tit includes time-related variables that expose trends,
cycles and sudden changes in popularity levels. Typical trends are so-called
honeymoon eﬀect in the beginning of an incumbency period and cost-of-
ruling trend reßecting wear and tear in popularity caused by passing of
time.
2 Issues related to Estimation of Popularity Func-
tion
In the following, we review some central aspects of the popularity function
research from the point of view of our study but for a more detailed and wider
surveys see for example Monroe (1984), Kiewiet and Rivers (1985), Lewis-
Beck (1988), Schneider and Frey (1988), Nannestad and Paldam (1994),
Anderson (1995), Norpoth (1996) or Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000). In
addition, Drazen (2000, Ch. 7) and Mueller (2003, Ch. 19) discuss both the-
oretical and empirical aspects of the popularity function and issues related
to it.
3 In addition, eﬀects of income taxes, balance of payments deÞcit, government expen-
ditures and debt, exchange rate, vacancies, bank rate, house building rate, Standard and
Poors Market index, military expenditures, food price and ratio of tax revenue to GDP
have been tested.
4For example wars, terrorist attacks, assasinations, scandals related to politicians or
parties, strike activities, by-elections, change of party leader.
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National economy, local economy and ones own pocketbook
A central issue in the popularity function research is determination of
the poll respondents economic reference group. In other words, what is the
economic unit whose development the respondent evaluates while making
the support decision. Is it the national economy that has essential role
(sociotropic approval basis) or is it the respondents own pocketbook that
matters (egotropic approval basis)? Or is it something between them, like
the local economic development?
Division between egotropic and sociotropic basis of approval was origi-
nally raised in Kinder and Kiewiet (1979). Both aspects have their support-
ers, though e.g. in Nannestad and Paldam (1994) it is concluded that the
sociotropic hypothesis receives more empirical support. The local economy
aspect is quite a new approach. Diverging regional economic development
and regionally diverging voting behavior has led the researchers to assume
and test whether it is the local economy that decides the party fate5. Apply-
ing the local economic indicators means going beyond the national averages
and closer to the poll respondents real decision-making environment.
Unemployment is often chosen to reßect the welfare of diﬀerent socioe-
conomic groups and geographic regions. Overall, there are several diﬀerent
unemployment indicators for the incumbent to be worried about. On the
individual level, unemployment has wide economic and mental consequences
as it not only aﬀects the person unemployed but also his/her family. On
the aggregate level, unemployment tells about unused resources. The local
unemployment labels the region either to potential future makers or losers
which attracts or distracts business.
Too often researchers see these diﬀerent reference groups exclusive to
each other. However, it shouldnt be so. Minding ones own pocketbook
5There are several studies on British data showing the importance of local economies
and residential neighborhoods for ones political opinions. See e.g. Pattie and Johnston
1995, 1997, 1998.
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shouldnt mean not minding the local economy or the national economy.
But whatever the researchers aspirations are, it is usually availability of
data that directs and sets limits to the research.
Similar behavior over time and everywhere
Generally, in the popularity function studies it is assumed that same
factors aﬀect the respondents decision making with same volume wherever
they live and whatever their socioeconomic background is. In addition,
the inßuence is assumed to stay stable over time no matter how long the re-
search period is or how turbulent the economic and/or political development
is. Possible changes in the society inßuencing the popularity series include
sudden or smooth changes of actors behind the institutions, small or large
scale ideological ßuctuation on party-level or in the society. Economic crisis,
new economic policy paradigms and changes in industrial composition may
also be seen in the popularity series. Not to mention that part of the respon-
dents change their opinion fast, another part change it slowly if at all. Not
only do these changes inßuence the relationship between the dependent and
explanatory variables in the popularity function, but they may also change
the statistical nature of the popularity series.
Every mentioned aspect is relevant in modern societies. Instability of
the estimated coeﬃcients is an admitted problem though there is a lack
of serious attempts to capture this instability. Time series econometrics
provides several techniques to model the changing coeﬃcients, depending
whether we assume the change to take place smoothly or abruptly (see
for example Maddala and Kim, 2001). Before modeling the relationship
between the popularity series and the explanatory variables, one needs to
be informed about the nature of the popularity series itself. This aspect of
research has received lately some attention in the US, where forecasting the
Presidential election result with help of survey data has become more and
more important.
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3 Summaries of the Essays
These studies are partly inspired by the above mentioned problems in the
popularity function research, partly by the depression that Finland and Swe-
den experienced in beginning of the 1990s. We address the above discussed
issues in the Þrst essay by studying the memory properties, i.e. shock persis-
tence, of party popularity series and examine whether the classiÞcations are
linked to the existence of structural breaks in the series. In the second essay,
we loosen the assumption of stable coeﬃcients by applying period analysis
and identifying two diﬀerent regimes for the inßuence of unemployment on
the party popularity. In the third essay, we connect each of the poll respon-
dents to their local economies and try to Þnd out whether the respondents in
diﬀerent areas behave diﬀerently either because of the economy or because
of the provincial eﬀect.
3.1 LongMemory and Structural Breaks in Finnish and Swedish
Party Popularity Series
Lately, studying time series properties of party popularity series has become
a topic in itself. Particularly, interest has arisen around the long memory
property found in the series (see e.g. Box-Steﬀensmeier and Smith, 1996,
1998, Byers et al., 1997, 2000, Clarke and Lebo, 2002, Lebo et al., 2000).
Composition of the popularity series gives us reason to assume that such
series have long memory but neither short nor perfect memory. Another
property that these series, as any other macro-level time series, may pos-
sess is structural breaks. Testing stationarity in the presence of structural
breaks may lead to miscategorizing. In the usual stationarity tests, ignoring
structural breaks leads us to conclude that the series has a unit root when
in reality it does not (Perron, 1989). The same problem applies to a series
with long memory. When we have classiÞed a series as having long memory,
there is a chance that we have confused long memory and a structural break
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(Diebold and Inoue, 2001).
We approach the problem by Þrst separately seeking long memory and
unknown multiple structural breaks. If both are found, then we control the
structural breaks in the series and test whether a unit root or long memory
still exists. This particular approach has not been applied to the popularity
series before. We apply this method to the popularity series of the four
biggest Finnish and Swedish parties for the period from 1987 to 2001. The
results classify party popularity series into perfect and long memory series,
but a chance of miscategorizing in the presence of structural breaks is also
apparent.
3.2 Is there a Threshold Eﬀect in the Party Popularities with
respect to the Changes in Unemployment?
In the second essay, aim is to examine the inßuence of dramatic economic
changes to party popularity series in two similar countries implementing dif-
ferent policies and, thus, experiencing diﬀerent outcomes. The crisis mea-
sured by its depth and length was by far greater in Finland than it was
in Sweden. We expect to see the mentioned diﬀerences in the results. In
addition, the turbulence in the economy and transformation in the society
brought about by the crisis led us to assume over time changing relationship
between party popularity and economy.
Our data consist of popularity ratings of the four biggest parties in Fin-
land and in Sweden from 1987 to 2001. We start with estimating a linear
popularity function separately for each party. As expected the results diﬀer
between Finland and Sweden. Finnish and Swedish sister-parties are inßu-
enced in opposite ways by the economy. Swedish left-wing parties (the Social
Democratic Party, the Left Party) are negatively aﬀected by unemployment
and inßation but the Finnish equivalents (the Social Democratic Party, the
Left Alliance) are positively inßuenced by the same variables. Popular-
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ity of Finnish right-wing parties (the Center Party, the National Coalition)
decreases when unemployment and inßation increase, but in Sweden the
Moderate Partys popularity increases along with unemployment. Reasons
for the diﬀerences may lie in the depth of the depression, the contents, and
success, of the policies practiced. In Sweden, most of the decisions on public
sector saving and cutbacks in transfers were made in 1994-95 by the Social
Democratic government, whereas in Finland most of the decisions on cut-
backs and public sector saving were made earlier by right-wing government.
We model varying inßuence of the economic variables on the party pop-
ularity by Þtting a threshold model to the Finnish and Swedish data. We
search for split points that change the inßuence of the unemployment on the
party popularities from plus to minus or to zero. The results conÞrm our
Þnding that Finnish voters turn to left-wing parties when unemployment is
high. We Þnd that unemployment needs to be high (11-15%) to inßuence
signiÞcantly Finnish party popularities, except popularity of the National
Coalition whose popularity suﬀers from unemployment all the time. When
the unemployment rate lies between 12.2% and 15.1% both unemployment
and inßation have a negative inßuence on right-wing parties. During most of
the right-wing government period the unemployment rate was within these
limits. Indeed, the Swedish results are much more diﬃcult to interpret and
conclude. Either the threshold is not signiÞcant (the Left Party, the Social
Democratic Party) or the number of observations in regime is very low (the
Center Party, the Moderate Party). Maybe the large autoregressive term
in the Swedish popularity function estimations absorbs the inßuence of the
other variables. Maybe the unemployment never rose high enough to reveal
the thresholds in the Swedish popularity functions.
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3.3 Local Unemployment and Other Factors Inßuencing In-
dividual Government Approval in Finland
In the beginning of the 1990s Finland experienced the deepest peace-time
recession in its history. The economic crisis touched somehow everyone
but at diﬀerent volumes. Its inßuence is still visible as regionally diverging
unemployment rates. We connect this to the regionally diverging govern-
ment approval rates and ask whether the survey respondents base their gov-
ernment evaluations on the local unemployment. In addition, we examine
whether the government approval in diﬀerent socioeconomic groups is linked
to their experiences in the crisis. In the Finnish aggregate data studies high
national unemployment has been connected to the decline of the incumbent
popularity as well as to the increase of left-wing party popularity (Nyberg,
2000, Asikainen, 2003).
Our biannual survey data covers the years of right-wing coalition from
1991 to 1995 and the years of the almost-all-inclusive coalition from 1995
to 2001. All the models are estimated for the diﬀerent government types
separately. Our results concerning the inßuence of the local unemployment
are colored by the dominant position of the Center Party in the Eastern
and Northern provinces which suﬀer from high local unemployment. In the
Þrst period, we Þnd that the high local unemployment does not increase
the respondents likelihood of not approving of the government, but the op-
posite happens in the latter period. Further, our results support the class
dealignment, as there is only weak indication of class-based support in the
farmers and blue collar workers groups. Even that emerges as non-support
since each of the groups is more likely not to approve of the government
traditionally in contrast with their interests (farmers - SDP led government,
blue collar workers - right-wing government). The diﬀerences in approval
by gender come up as we estimate the inßuence of education within gen-
ders separately. In the latter period, men with no training and women with
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either polytechnic or academic education are less likely to approve of the
government. The discontent is visible among the academic women already
in the Þrst period. The men without training face the risks of unemploy-
ment, poverty and being estranged from the society. The already less-well-oﬀ
position combined with the cutbacks of social transfers in the 1990s may
lead them to oppose the government. The academic women may feel dis-
content with the government due to the cutbacks in welfare services and
transfers which insure against being less-well-oﬀ if, for example, faced with
the single-parenthood.
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II
Long Memory and Structural Breaks in Finnish
and Swedish Party Popularity Series
Anna-Leena Asikainen
December 12, 2002
Abstract
A time series with a unit root or fractional root can be miscate-
gorized in stationarity tests if the series has structural breaks. We
test this Þnding on Finnish and Swedish party popularity series.
The composition and nature of popularity series provide reasons to
assume fractional dynamics. Our observation period, 1987-2001, of-
fers several reasons for the existence of structural breaks. We Þnd
that three series have breaks and in two cases control of the struc-
tural breaks changes the unit root assumption to a fractional root.
Thus, popularity series have either long or perfect memory, but this
property cannot be explained by controlling structural breaks.
Keywords: political party popularity, fractional root, structural
breaks
JEL ClassiÞcation: D72, C22
1 Introduction
This study asks whether we can completely ignore fundamental changes in so-
ciety in analyzing the stationarity of party popularity ratings. As time series
data is nowadays a popular way to explore voting behavior and factors aﬀect-
ing election results, the stationarity of popularity series has come under intense
scrutiny (Box-Steﬀensmeier and Smith, 1996, 1998, Byers et al., 1997, 2000,
Clarke and Lebo, 2002, Lebo et al., 2000). Correct information on stationar-
ity has consequences for econometric modeling if the series are used in further
econometric analysis. Incorrect assumptions may cause problems for statistical
inference, the forecasting performance of the model and lag structure speciÞca-
tion. Good forecasting performance is especially important in countries where
the government can decide on the timing of elections and economic policy mea-
sures. Incumbents also have a tendency to create politically induced business
cycles. In that case it is useful to have information on aggregate approval be-
havior with respect to economic policy changes. Whether the inßuence of a
change is positive or negative is quite trivial, but a more challenging task is to
Þnd out how long the inßuence lasts. Anticipating the persistence of a shock in
political popularity has been of interest to political scientists and politicians for
a long time, but until now we have not had proper methods of capturing this
eﬀect.
Stationarity analysis is mostly about Þnding out how a series reacts to a
shock. There are three options for shock persistence: it lasts either forever or
long or short time. When the series has a unit root, the series has perfect mem-
ory, when the shock eﬀect lasts long we say that the series has long memory, and
when the eﬀect of the shock dies out quickly the series has short memory. The
composition of popularity series gives us reason to assume that such series have
long memory but neither short nor perfect memory. Popularity series is a sum
of the survey answers of heterogenous respondents, aggregation over individu-
als favors long-memoried alternatives (Granger, 1980). Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that popularity ratings have long memory since, after experiencing a
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shock, the rating changes smoothly as some supporters are slow to change their
opinion of the party if they are doing it at all (Byers and Peel, 1997). Whereas
other respondents change their opinions quickly. This division in the supporter
group creates a smooth change over time in the popularity series. In addition,
voters react to diﬀerent events; some react mainly to political events and oth-
ers only to economic events (Zaller, 1992). Further, the popularity series are
bounded from above and from below. Thus, the series can wander only within
the limits (1-100).
Another important issue in time series analysis we have to be aware of is
structural breaks. Since, several macro-level time series have structural breaks
because of exogenous shocks and major institutional changes (Perron, 1989), the
occurrence of such breaks in party popularity ratings is also highly probable. In
general, public opinion is assumed to project the state of the society and changes
in society should be reßected in the polls. Elections can cause structural breaks
in popularity series by various means. Before the elections the information level
of voters increases as the media concentrate on campaigns and the achievements
of the incumbents. After elections the actors behind institutions change and this
may cause a break as well. Other possible causes of structural breaks are changes
in parliamentary status (from government to opposition, and vice versa; from
the prime ministers party to an incumbent or opposition party), changes in the
poll sampling method and the wording of survey questions. Party popularity
ratings may also reßect changes in the economy and economic policy. We may
thus conÞdently assume that there may be several unknown break points in a
popularity series.
When there is a reason to doubt that a series has both of these properties,
we have to be especially careful in time series property analysis. In the usual
stationarity tests, ignoring structural breaks leads us to conclude that the series
has a unit root when in reality it does not (Perron, 1989). The same problem
applies to a series with long memory. This is still a potential problem as tests
have not yet been developed to distinguish long memory from structural breaks.
When we have classiÞed a series as having long memory, i.e. the eﬀect of a
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shock lasts long, there is a chance that we have confused long memory and
a structural break (Diebold and Inoue, 2001). The nature and composition
of party popularity series supports the presence of structural breaks and long
memory. We approach the problem by Þrst separately seeking long memory
and unknown multiple structural breaks. If both are found, then we control
the structural breaks in the series and test whether a unit root or long memory
still exists. This particular approach has not been applied to popularity series
before, but for example to S&P500 absolute stock returns in Granger and Hyung
(2004).
This reasoning applies to the popularity series of Finnish and Swedish par-
ties. The four biggest parties in each country have been chosen as targets of the
analysis. The Finnish parties included are the Left Alliance (LA), the Social
Democratic Party (SDP), the Center Party (CENT) and the National Coalition
Party (NC). The corresponding Swedish parties are the Left Party (LP), the
Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Center Party (CENT) and the Moderate
Party (MP). Finnish popularity ratings have been obtained by Taloustutkimus
and the Swedish ratings are from SIFO. Monthly data is from September 1987
to October 2001. Large ßuctuation in economic circumstances, changes in the
economic policy regime and political paradigms make it reasonable to assume
that these series will exhibit multiple break points in this period. Both coun-
tries experienced the deepest peace-time depression ever in the 1990s. Other
changes aﬀecting these countries and related to the Þrst mentioned are over-
all liberalization in the economy (from a controlled market economy to a more
pure form of market economy), an increase in general market-orientation, regime
change in economic and monetary policy (EMU convergence criteria, inßation
targets), EU membership, the collapse of Soviet Union and changes in industrial
structure, not to mention elections and events within parties and politics.
In the following, we Þrst describe the statistical diﬀerences between unit
root, fractional root and stationary series. In chapter 3, we test which of these
characterizations best Þts the popularity series. As is already clear, there is a se-
rious threat of misinterpretation of those tests if we do not pay proper attention
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to the possible existence of structural breaks. Section 4 applies a sequential test
in the search for multiple unknown break points. The last procedure is to test
whether the break points cause stationarity properties in Finnish and Swedish
party popularity series.
2 Integer vs. Fractional Integration
This section deÞnes diﬀerent memory lengths using statistical terms. As is usual
(see e.g. Maddala and Kim, 1998) we see how close to each other these nonsta-
tionary and stationary series are in theory, noting their behavior of variance and
autocorrelation structure. Finally, we explain why it is reasonable to assume
that popularity series have each of these structures.
We illuminate the diﬀerences between integer and fractional integration by
representing a linear time series as ARIMA model. Let us consider a series
with the following formulation φ(L)(1 − L)dXt = θ(L)εt, where L represents
a lag operator, θ(L) is a stationary autoregressive process, d is a real number
between 0 and 1, θ(L) a stationary MA process, and εt is i.i.d. Obviously, many
properties depend on d, the order of integration.
If d=0, the series has short memory, which means that correlation between
consecutive observations fades out quickly and the series returns to its constant
mean. Its variance is Þnite and its mean, variance and covariance are constant.
This series is modeled by combining an autoregressive and a moving average
parameter as in ARIMA (p,0,q).
If d=1, the series is a nonstationary unit root process. Variance is time-
dependent and inÞnite. This series is a function of its previous value and current
error. The eﬀect of a shock grows (cumulates) over time and the series does not
revert to a constant mean level. Modeling involves diﬀerencing the unit root
process and then applying stationary autoregressive moving average parameters
in the form of ARIMA (p,1,q).
If 0<d<1, the series has a fractional root (or long memory). This series has
properties of both stationary and nonstationary series. All the series with d in
19
this range are similar as to memory and mean reversion, but diﬀer in variance
behavior depending on whether d is above or below 0.5. When d lies between
0 and 0.5 (0<d<0.5) the variance and autocovariances are Þnite and constant,
and the series is stationary. When d belongs to 0.5≤d<1, variance is inÞnite,
autocovariances are nonconstant, and the series is nonstationary. Here we con-
centrate mainly on the case where d is 0.5≤d<1. It is said that in stationary
processes autocorrelation decays at an exponential rate, but in fractional root
processes it decays at a hyperbolic rate. In other words, autocorrelation decays
more slowly the greater the value d has. The series is modeled by ARFIMA
(p,d,q), a general approach to testing autoregressive and moving average prop-
erties which includes estimating ARMA (p,0,q) and ARIMA (p,1,q) models as
its special cases. The general properties of I(d) are discussed in reviews by
Baillie et al. (1996) and Sowell (1992).
In general, macro-level time series are found to have unit roots (Nelson and
Plosser, 1982). In popularity series stationarity means very stable popularity
shares because of mean reversion. Strict stationarity in popularity series practi-
cally blocks the emergence of new parties, which is not a very plausible assump-
tion in normal democracies. In unit root processes large and persistent shocks
may occur, but in the normal situation large and persistent popularity changes
are not likely. The interest in understanding why popularity series could be char-
acterized by fractional dynamics has increased recently (e.g. Box-Steﬀensmeier
and Smith, 1996, 1998). Popularity series are created by aggregating heteroge-
nous individual-level behavior. If one survey respondents behavior has a unit
root or a fractional root, then the whole aggregated data set has it (Granger,
1980). Heterogenous in this context means diﬀerences in a personss autoregres-
sive behavior. Heterogenous memory properties may arise from diﬀerences in
the information level of voters, the persistence of party identiÞcation, myopia,
rationality and reaction speed1. The fact that the series has clearly deÞned
upper and lower limits (0-100) also supports the assumption about fractional
1There are several empirical studies showing the inßuence of information level diﬀerences
on the pattern of party approvals, such as Zaller 1992.
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dynamics.
As we have seen, the description of I(0), I(1) and I(d) is quite simple in
statistical theory. The crucial diﬀerences between the actual series are caused
by one parameter.
3 Detecting Fractional Integration
Our strategy in testing stationarity is to move from autocorrelation plots to
more sophisticated tests. In this phase we take the possibility of structural
breaks into account. There are several easily applied and widely used tests
to detect whether a series is either I(0) or I(1). We start with one of them,
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. After that we move on to a more
sophisticated method to ascertain whether the results diﬀer from each other.
The Þrst approach to exploring the length of memory in a time series is to
examine the correlation structure of consecutive observations. In the following
Þgures (Figures 1-2), actual party popularity ratings are plotted with corre-
sponding autocorrelation functions in Finland and Sweden. The more slowly
decreasing an autocorrelation structure a series has, the longer the memory.
There are two more precise ways to Þnd out whether a series is fractionally
integrated or not: tests and point estimation of d, the decay rate. In general,
unit root tests are consistent against I(d) alternatives (Baillie, 1996). Although
fractional root is not an explicit alternative in the ADF test, we have chosen it
because it has some power against fractional integration and it is best adaptable
unit root test for a short series. The H0 hypothesis of ADF is a unit root. The
ADF test has been criticized for its low power in detecting fractional integration
(Diebold and Rudebusch, 1991). It does not directly indicate whether the series
has a fractional root but this weakness can be covered if we can conclude that a
series possibly has a fractional root when both alternatives are excluded. Table
1 shows ADF test results. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test does not reject
the hypothesis of I(1) for any series. The ADF test sheds some light on the
question of long as against short memory but, as we recall, the ADF test tends
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to underreject H0 if there are breaks in the trend.
Table 1. ADF test results2 , Ho: unit root.
Finland Sweden
LA/LP -2.54 -1.16
SDP -1.83 -1.82
CENT -1.92 -1.38
NC/MP -2.10 -1.66
LA - Left Alliance, SDP - Social Democratic Party, CENT -Center Party, NC -
National Coalition Party
The most exact information on the memory decay process is obtained by esti-
mating the decay rate, d. There are three methods of doing this: semiparametric
estimation (Geweke and Porter-Hudak, 1983), the approximate maximum like-
lihood in the frequency domain (Li and McLeod, 1986, Fox and Taqqu, 1986)
and the exact maximum likelihood in the time domain (Sowell, 1992). Since
the Þrst two do not perform well in small samples (Sowell 1992), the following
results are computed with ARFIMA 1.0 (Ooms and Doornik, 1998) which uses
Ox (Sowell) and GiveWin frameworks3.
Before applying Sowells method, the data is Þrst-diﬀerenced to ensure sta-
tionarity. ARFIMAmodels with diﬀerent ps and qs are estimated and the most
suitable ARFIMA model chosen using Akaikes Information Criteria. The AIC
depends on the number of parameters estimated, the residual sum of squares
and the sample size. Simplifying to some extent, the smaller the AIC value gets,
the better the model Þts the data. The AIC values are reported in the Appendix
(Table 1.). The AIC shows that ARFIMA (0,d,0) describes every Swedish party
popularity series best.
2Constant included, applied lag length 4. The lag length is chosen with help of
general to speciÞc rule (see e.g. Ng and Perron, 1995). Critical values: 5%=-2.881
1%=-3.475.
3 Sowells Exact Maximum Likelihood estimator for OX. The ARFIMA package is down-
loadable from Doorniks homepage (www.nuﬀ.ox.ac.uk/users/doornik).
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Figure 1. Time series plots and autocorrelation functions of Finnish party popularities.
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Figure 2. Time series plots and autocorrelation functions of Swedish party popularities.
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There is more variation in the Finnish results. ARFIMA (0,d,1) performs
best in the SDP’s and NC’s popularity series, ARFIMA (3,d,0) in the LA’s and
ARFIMA (2,d,0) in the CENT’s popularity series. In previous studies AIC has
in most cases chosen the ARFIMA (0,d,0) model to best describe the properties
of party or US presidential popularity (Byers et al., 2000, Lebo et al., 2000,
Box-Steﬀensmeier and Smith, 1996). The ARFIMA model selected has been
estimated and a combination of tests and point estimates used in categorizing
a series as a unit root, fractional root or short memory series. A series is
concluded to have a fractional root when d falls within 0.5≤d<1. In addition,
the t-test determines whether d diﬀers from 0 or 1 t-test. There is reason to
suspect fractional integration if the tests reject both stationarity and a unit root
(Baillie et al., 1996). In tables 2-3 bd’s and their standard errors are reported as
well as t-test values for two diﬀerent H0 hypotheses (d=0 and d=1). Normal
distribution is used for critical values in the t-test.
Table 2. bd’s, standard errors and t-tests for Finnish parties.
Finland t-testbd s.e. H0:d=0 H0: d=1
LA 0.98 0.09 11.59*** -0.21
SDP 1.00 0.16 6.21*** -0.00
CENT 0.95 0.12 8.29*** -0.40
NC 0.96 0.39 2.47*** -0.09
LA - Left Alliance, SDP - Social Democratic Party, CENT -Center Party, NC -
National Coalition Party. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1.
In general, the assumptions of I(0) are rejected in favor of I(1). Fractional
integration is not suspected in any instance. Because Finnish party popularities
have not been tested before for fractional integration, there is no comparable
evidence for these results. In this phase we conclude that these series seem
to be I(1). This result leaves the possibility of confusion between long/perfect
memory and structural break still open.
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Table 3. bd’s, standard errors and t-tests for Swedish parties.
Sweden t-testbd s.e. H0: d=0 H0: d=1
LP 0.88 0.06 13.67*** -1.95*
SDP 0.97 0.06 15.93*** -0.46
CENT 0.69 0.07 10.38*** -4.77***
MP 0.86 0.06 13.38*** -2.25**
LP - Left Party, SDP - Social Democratic Party, CENT - Center Party, MP -
Moderate Party. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1.
Results for Swedish parties are diﬀerent. In all but the Social Democratic
Party popularity series both hypotheses, I(0) and I(1), are rejected. I(0) is
rejected at the 1% level of significance, whereas I(1) is rejected for the Left Party
at 1% level of significance, for the Center Party at the 1% level of significance
and for the Moderate Party at the 5% level of significance. This leads us to
assume fractional integration in those series. The magnitude of estimated d
also supports the assumption of a fractional root. In the Social Democratic
Party series only I(0) is rejected which signals that the series is I(1). There are
previous results on stationarity in Swedish party popularity series in Byers et
al. (2000). In their study Swedish parties have somewhat higher estimated d’s
than those reported here, but the sample period also diﬀers. Byers et al. (2000)
found that the popularity series of 26 parties possess very similar properties.
In large samples d gets values from 0.65 to 0.85. Controversial results are also
possible, since for example for the approval ratings of the US President the
length of persistence has been best characterized by a stationary, unit root,
strongly autoregressive near integrated or fractionally integrated process4.
These results suggest that it is possible to conclude confidently that in any
case these series are not I(0). There is some discrepancy between the ADF
and ARFIMA results. In 3 of 8 cases, ADF classifies the series diﬀerently than
ARFIMA does. It is also interesting that all the diﬀerently classified series are
4The time series properties of the US President’s popularity have been studied in DeBoef
2000, Ostrom and Smith 1992, Durr 1993 and Wlezien 1996.
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Swedish. There are several possible explanations for these inconsistent results.
Firstly, the ADF test has low power against I(d). Secondly, especially the
small number of observations may make it diﬃcult to tell a stationary from a
nonstationary process5. We can also question the assumption of long memory
in series which cover only 14 years. If we Þnd long memory, can we really
speak about long-term time dependence? Thirdly, it has been shown in theory
that both I(0) and I(1) can mistakenly be classiÞed as I(d) when there is a
structural change in the series (Diebold and Inoue, 2001). Let us assume a
structural change taking place in the following stationary series of the form
yt = αyt−1 + εt, |α| < 1. Whatever the size and form of the change in all cases
its eﬀect is downsized by the coeﬃcient of the autoregressive term (|α| < 1),
which eventually drives the series back to its mean. Thus, long memory and
structural change can be confused with each other. As to the nonstationary
series, the weak small sample properties of the unit root tests often yield results
that classify I(d) as I(1).
4 Detecting Structural Changes
Domingo and Tonella (2002) have described the nature of structural changes
very well Structural changes appear when some part or properties are lost or
added to the object, some relations appear, disappear or change their form. In
other words, structural changes imply changes in the object identity. Of course,
this may happen in such a small degree that the change is unnoticeable, or in
such a degree that the system becomes practically a new one.
It is essential to test the potential existence of structural breaks in these
series, as they might be the reason for controversial results in the stationarity
tests discussed above. There is already textbook-like literature on unit roots
and structural breaks (see e.g. Maddala and Kim, 1998) but when the unit
5Probability of rejection of I(1) in the ADF test when the series actually is I(d) increases
with sample size. For a series with d=0.75, the rejection probabilities are about 50% when
N=100 and about 70% when N=250.(Hassler and Wolters, 1994)
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root assumption is replaced by a fractional root there is not much literature to
which to refer. A study by Diebold and Inoue (2001) provide both theoretical
proof and Monte Carlo evidence for this possibility of misunderstanding. In
their paper structural change is considered as one cause of long memory clas-
siÞcation. In the Monte Carlo part of their study, Diebold and Inoue stress
the importance of testing both I(0) and I(1), as these two classiÞcations have
contrary memory properties. They conclude that they have clear theoretical
and empirical evidence for confusing long memory and structural change. After
Diebold and Inoue, Granger and Hyung (2004) dealt with the same problem
and we approach the question as they do.
There is already evidence for our series to have long or perfect memory. In
other words, they are either I(d) or I(1). We start by testing the existence of
structural breaks with the method developed by Bai (1997), which is suitable for
seeking multiple unknown structural break points in autoregressive models. This
method Þnds one break point at a time. Beside Þnding an unknown break point,
this test indicates its timing as well. Basically, the test procedure goes as follows.
An autoregressive model, like yt = ρyt−1 + εt, εt ∼ IN(0, 1), t = 1, 2, ..., T , is
estimated by OLS. The appropriate number of lags is chosen by AIC, reported
in Appendix (Table 2). Let us assume that a break point is found at time point
m. The data is then divided into two subsamples
yt = ρ1yt−1 + ε1t, t = 1, 2, ...,m
and
yt = ρ2yt−1 + ε2t, t = m+ 1, ..., T.
These autoregressive models are estimated by OLS, the exact number of
lags for each partys AR-model is found with help of AIC. The parameter con-
stancy over the subsamples is examined by a test presented in Bai and Perron
(1998). We have applied critical values in Bai and Perron (2004)6. Our trim-
ming percentage is 15. This procedure is repeated until parameter constancy is
not rejected for any subsample.
6The critical values in Bai and Perron (2004) recognize the trimming percentage, the
number of parameters in the model and how many breaks have already been found.
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Structural break tests were performed for every Finnish series, though the
ADF and ARFIMA results were not controversial. The plot of the SDPs series,
however, reveals the need for a structural break test. Appendix (Tables 3 and
4) lists all the potential break points with their signiÞcance and timing7. Of the
Finnish series only the SDPs popularity has structural breaks. Two Swedish
series have structural breaks, the SDP and the LP. There are 1-3 break points
in the series. All these series have one break time in common, 6/1994. In many
Swedish series the breaks are very close to being signiÞcant. The dates of the
break points coincide with closeness of an election, the deepest phase of the
economic crisis and a turning point in unemployment.
We complement our stationarity tests with a unit root test that takes struc-
tural breaks into account (Lanne et al., 2002)8. In the test the potential break
points are highlighted by a dummy variable one at a time. We Þnd that the null
hypothesis of nonstationarity is rejected for the Left Alliance at the 10% level
of signiÞcance. Complete results are listed in the Appendix (Tables 3 and 4).
The next phase is to Þnd out whether these breaks are the source of long
memory. Our way to approach this question is to estimate an autoregressive
model in which the breaks are controlled by step-dummies. If step-dummies
remove or reduce long memory properties (i.e. decrease the value of d) in the
series, then the breaks can be suspected of being the cause of long memory. In
the following, we illustrate the estimation with an AR(1) model that has two
breaks9 yt = α1+ β1yt−1+D1(α2+β2yt−1)+D2(α3+ β3yt−1)+ εt. D1 equals
1 starting from the Þrst break date and D2 equals 1 starting from the second
break date, otherwise they are 0. The residuals of this AR(1) model are saved
and the order of integration d is estimated by Sowells ARFIMA method. In
other words, the existence of unit roots in these series, which are cleansed of
structural breaks, is estimated. If there is long or perfect memory left then it
7Here we applied Hansens (2000) GAUSS code for estimating the break points.
8Test is found in statistical package JMulti (www.jmulti.de).
9 It appears that there are from one to three breaks and the model varies from AR(1) to
AR(5).
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should be of pure form, not to be confused with structural breaks. This
testing is done for the series with breaks and for the series where unit root test
rejected unit root.
Table 4. bd’s, standard errors and t-tests for residuals10 .
party ARFIMA t-test
residuals model bd s.e. H0:d=0 H0: d=1
Finland SDP (0,d,0) 0.81 0.06 12.60*** -2.98***
Sweden SDP (0,d,0) 0.83 0.07 11.48*** -2.40**
LP (0,d,0) 0.90 0.06 14.10*** -1.50
SDP- Social Democratic Party, LP - Left Party. Significance levels: *** = 0.01,
** = 0.05, * = 0.1.
Controlling structural breaks seems to alternate classifications I(1) and I(d).
In the case of the Finnish and Swedish SDP it looks as if controlling for structural
breaks removes the unit root property. The value of d declines and the t-test
rejects both options, I(0) and I(1). There is thus a possibility that these party
series could have been classified as I(1) when in fact they had structural breaks
and long memory. For the Finnish SDP this should not be a surprise since a
quick look at the time series plot reveals the existence of structural change. The
Left Party results do not support the hypothesis, although the change in the
value of d is very small. We have performed checks for robustness by including
breaks that are close to being significant in d estimations and checked whether
their inclusion changes the value of bd. The result is that this does not occur.
5 Conclusions
The results reported in this paper categorize party popularity series into per-
fect and long memory series, but a chance of miscategorizing in the presence of
structural breaks is also apparent. After diﬀerent stationarity tests, we exam-
ined whether the same series have structural breaks. If they did, their in-
10Critical values from standardized normal distribution.
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ßuence on the series was removed by estimating an autoregressive model with
step-dummies at break points. The residuals of the regression were tested for
stationarity.
The weakest form of stationarity test applied here, the ADF test, categorizes
all the series as having a unit root. A slightly more elaborate way to explore
stationarity in time series is to estimate the order of integration. Sowells es-
timation method recognizes 5 series with unit root and 3 with fractional root.
When the inßuence of structural breaks is removed and order of integration is
reestimated, the classiÞcation changes in two of the three series. In both cases
it changes from a unit root to a fractional root.
After these exercises we can conclude that of the Finnish parties the Left
Alliance, Center Party and National Coalition Party have series with a unit
root. In Swedish parties only the Left Party popularity has a unit root. Parties
with a fractional root in popularity series are the Swedish Center Party and the
Moderate Party and Social Democratic Parties in both countries. Obviously, a
series with well-deÞned limits can not possess all the properties of a unit root
series. But nevertheless that seems to be the result for many party popularity
series here. As a solution to this controversy, we suggest that unit root is the
best local approximation for those series.
Clearly the issue needs more attention in the future. Our results initiate
several interesting new approaches. Firstly, increasing the number of observa-
tions. It is possible that classiÞcation between stationarity and non-stationarity
depends on the period under study. Secondly, including smaller parties in the
sample. It might be that larger swings in popularity, typical of big parties, re-
sult in (local) unit root conclusion, whereas smaller parties experiencing smaller
swings would be classiÞed with fractional root. Thirdly, Þnding ßuctuation
boundaries for each party. Despite the swings of any size each party has its
cleavage whose support leads the popularity ratings to ßuctuate between some
boundaries. Finding these boundaries and studying how the series behaves in
the vicinity of the boundaries might add some new aspects to the behavior of
party popularity series. Fourthly, disaggregating the data and estimating the
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degree of integration in diﬀerent groups (gender, education, income, etc.) might
shed some light on whether there is a group whose behavior drives the result.
If these series are applied in popularity function estimation, which is often
the case, the same kind of procedure should be conducted for the explanatory
variables, since there is an obvious risk of co-integration. Apart from that,
combined examination might give some indication of the occurrence of (partisan)
political business cycles. The logic is that if popularity and economic variables
have structural breaks at the same time and if this happens around elections then
we could conclude that the party in power aﬀects the nature of unemployment
and/or inßation series.
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Appendix
Table 1. AICs for diﬀerent ARFIMA models, * marks the lowest value.
Finland Sweden
LA SDP CENT NC LP SDP CENT MP
0,d,0 2.39 3.49 3.09 2.94 2.78* 3.93* 2.45* 3.39*
1,d,0 2.34 3.48 3.10 2.92 2.79 3.94 2.47 3.40
2,d,0 2.31 3.48 3.08* 2.92 2.79 2.95 2.47 3.41
3,d,0 2.26* 3.49 3.09 2.94 2.79 3.96 2.48 3.43
0,d,1 2.28 3.47* 3.09 2.91* 2.79 3.94 2.47 3.40
0,d,2 2.27 3.49 3.10 2.92 2.79 3.95 2.47 3.42
0,d,3 2.27 3.49 3.09 2.94 2.80 3.96 2.48 3.43
1,d,1 2.83 3.49 3.10 2.93 2.80 3.95 2.47 3.42
Table 2. Number of lags used in AR models for seeking a break point. Number
of lags determined by AIC.
Finland Sweden
LA/LP 4 3
SDP 2 1
CENT 3 2
NC/MP 5 2
Table 3. List of break points in Finnish series.
var obs. time Break test UR testa
LA 40. 4/1991 5.19 -2.64*
119. 10/1998 11.63 -2.63*
SDP 10. 4/1988 8.07 -1.74
53. 8/1992 23.94*** -1.76
74. 6/1994 13.78* -1.75
105. 6/1997 6.38 -1.58
129. 10/1999 8.3 -1.74
CENT 36. 1/1991 12.44 -2.02
94. 5/1996 9.58 -1.86
104. 5/1997 7.7 -1.91
NC 31. 8/1990 13.27 -2.03
89. 12/1995 16.08 -2.13
126. 6/1999 10.23 -1.92
aH0: I(1). SigniÞcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1.
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Table 4. List of break points in Swedish series.
var obs. time Break test UR testa
LP 11. 4/1988 8.3 -1.51
40. 1/1991 10.57 -1.46
78. 6/1994 26.11*** -1.44
89. 6/1995 12.49 -1.52
103. 10/1996 11.41 -1.46
132. 5/1999 13.57 -1.59
SDP 17. 12/1988 12.54* -1.86
42. 3/1991 14.12** -1.86
78. 6/1994 13.89** -1.88
107. 2/1997 4.84 -1.88
123. 8/1998 5.7 -1.84
CENT 12. 5/1988 10.64 -1.79
38. 11/1990 11.98 -2.22
59. 10/1992 12.95 -1.68
105. 11/1996 11.66 -1.66
150. 1/2001 16.66* -1.75
MP 12. 5/1988 11.47 -1.99
78. 6/1994 9.82 -2.14
121. 4/1998 13.49 -1.99
128. 1/1999 10.64 -2.06
146. 9/2000 10.68 -2.08
aH0: I(1). SigniÞcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1.
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Is there a threshold eﬀect in party popularity with
respect to changes in unemployment?
Anna-Leena Asikainen
March 15, 2004
Abstract
Our aim is to examine how a severe economic crisis with similar
causes in diﬀerent, but similar countries is reßected in party popular-
ity when there are diﬀerences in recovery policies, and in the depth
and length of the crisis. In 1987-2001 unemployment and inßation had
the opposite eﬀect on the popularity of Finnish and Swedish left-wing
and right-wing parties. The popularity of Finnish right-wing (left-
wing) parties decreased (increased) when unemployment and inßation
increased but in Sweden the opposite happened although the countries
simultaneously experienced a similar economic crisis. Instability in the
inßuence of the economy is almost inevitable in times of turbulence.
We model this instability by establishing a threshold model in popular-
ity functions. High unemployment (<10.7%) increases the popularity
of Finnish left-wing parties. Right-wing parties lose support when
unemployment is between 12.2% and 15.1%. In other respects their
popularity moves in diﬀerent directions with respect to the economy.
For Swedish parties no meaningful thresholds are found.
Keywords: popularity function, depression, threshold model
JEL ClassiÞcation: D72
1 Introduction
It is an undeniable empirical fact that the economy aﬀects election outcomes
and political parties monthly popularity ratings. Party fortunes alternate
with economic up- and downturns. Incumbent parties are found to be espe-
cially vulnerable to changes in unemployment levels although these changes
would be of a size expected in a normal business cycle. Our aim is to ex-
amine how dramatic changes in the economy, particularly in unemployment,
inßuence party popularity. The depression of the 1990s in Finland and Swe-
den was not just an economic phenomenon, it also transformed society as a
whole. However, the most visible, and easiest to measure, change occurred
in the level of unemployment. Turbulence in the economy leads us to assume
that the relationship between the economy and party popularity changes in
nature over time. We expect the relationship to vary, not only according to
the party involved, but also the level of unemployment. In order to verify
this, we Þrst analyze by subperiods. If there are signiÞcant diﬀerences in
the results of this period analysis, we attempt to Þnd out whether these dif-
ferences are related to variations in unemployment. More speciÞcally, does
the party popularity behave diﬀerently with respect to unemployment in
circumstances of low unemployment and high unemployment?
The idea of election outcomes being a result of the incumbents per-
formance originates in Downs (1957). In the Downsian world, voter and
government maximize their utilities. The government tries to please the
voter in order to get re-elected, and the voter holds the government respon-
sible for its economic policy. The voter shows his/her trust (distrust) by
voting either for or against the incumbent. The elections are like referen-
dums on the incumbents economic performance. Downs called this pattern
of behavior the responsibility hypothesis. Hibbs (1977) complemented the
responsibility hypothesis by attaching diﬀerent issue-priorities to left-wing
and right-wing parties. The partisan hypothesis holds that left-wing parties
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are more concerned about unemployment and right-wing parties are more
concerned about inßation.
There are some institutional requirements for the Downsian voting hy-
pothesis: there have to be clear patterns of accountability between political
institutions, and the voters have to be able to get the underachievers out of
oﬃce with their vote. Furthermore, the incumbents have to oﬀer incentives
for their re-election and the opposition has to have a credible role. However,
the Downsian theory does not provide answers for all the issues involved.
One group of questions concerns unexpected changes in the economy and un-
intended consequences of policy actions. How should a voter react when an
incumbents deviation from a promised policy actually increases the voters
welfare? Is it reasonable to punish the incumbent for such a deviation if
the reason for the deviation is an exogenous shock? One answer given in
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997, 35) is that a naive voter would pun-
ish an unlucky incumbent, whereas a rational voter would, at least in part,
take bad luck into consideration. In interpretations of the causes of the
1990s economic crisis bad luck, among other reasons, has been considered
(Honkapohja and Koskela, 1999). These issues are relevant for this study,
as, during the crisis, politicians were forced to act in an environment where
the next day would almost certainly bring about something unexpected.
In addition, one has to consider certain features in the political structures
of the countries concerned, if one wishes to interpret the results from the
point of view of Downsian theory. From 1995 to 2001, Finland was governed
by two successive multi-party governments each consisting of two left-wing
parties, a green party, a right-wing party, and a liberal party. Each and every
government was formed around the National Coalition. In Sweden, there
had been a social democratic one-party minority government since 1994.
One-party minority governments are forced to rely on the help of opposition
parties in order to pass legislation. Thus, it is not only the incumbent that
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is responsible for the outcome. These features give us an opportunity to try
and shed some light on the question as to how incumbent parties are treated
in a coalition government. Do the cabinet positions held by a party count
or is something else responsible for success or failure, praise or blame? Who
does one punish when almost all the parties are included in the governing
coalition? Is it the issue-priorities of the parties that determine approval?
Nevertheless, these shortcomings in Downsian theory should not deter us
from taking the responsibility hypothesis as our starting point.
The Þrst studies (Kramer, 1971, Mueller, 1970, Goodhart and Bhansali,
1970) empirically connecting party, presidential, or congressional popularity
to economic development were concerned with two-party systems. Since the
beginning of the 1970s, research has widened to cover almost all relevant
countries and party systems. In addition, the questions posed have evolved
from the simple existence of the relationship to more delicate issues. The
latest Finnish and Swedish studies on the vote (Sweden: Jordahl, 2001) and
popularity function (Finland: Nyberg, 1999, Mattila, 1994) provide support
for the responsibility hypothesis. Earlier studies concerning Sweden found
that government popularity was inßuenced by both inßation and unemploy-
ment (Jonung and Wadensjö, 1979) or by unemployment alone (Lybeck,
1985, Hibbs and Madsen, 1981). A multi-country study (Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, Sweden) on government popularity concluded that the fewer
the incumbent parties, the stronger the inßuence of the economy (Mattila,
1996). Using the same group of countries, another study concluded that
the vote for the leftist parties in particular depends on the success of the
economy (Pacek and Radcliﬀ, 1999).
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Our study diﬀers from previous studies as the focus here is on the eﬀect of
an economic depression on party popularity. More speciÞcally, the following
hypotheses are proposed:
1. In the beginning of the 1990s, Finland and Sweden experienced its
worst depression in peacetime. In the period under study there is a
lot of variation in the economic indicators. Reliable results regarding
the economys inßuence on party popularity in so-called normal times
are already available. Thus, we are eager to Þnd out whether these
results still hold true in extraordinary times. We expect that the way
voters evaluate parties changes over time. In addition, we wish to
examine how any blame is distributed among the incumbents in a
coalition government.
2. The causes of the crisis and the timeline of events were identical in
Finland and Sweden. Nevertheless, the economic policies used to han-
dle the crisis were diﬀerent. The Þnancial policy in Sweden was more
countercyclical than it was in Finland. For the average citizen, the un-
employment rate is expected to reßect diﬀerences in economic policies.
In Sweden unemployment never rose above 10%, whereas in Finland
the unemployment rate rose to about 18%. In Finland, unemploy-
ment has remained relatively high since the depression years. Thus,
the question is, are the incumbent parties treated diﬀerently in the
two countries?
3. We assume that in circumstances of low unemployment voters are
likely to rate the parties diﬀerently with respect to the economy than
in circumstances of high unemployment. The result can follow ei-
ther the responsibility hypothesis, according to which the incumbents
are punished for high unemployment, or the issue-priority hypothesis,
according which high unemployment increases support for left-wing
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parties. In order to determine the level of unemployment at which ap-
proval behavior changes, we apply a threshold model. At the threshold
point, the inßuence of unemployment on party popularity alternates
its sign.
In the following, we provide a brief description of the political structures
in Finland and Sweden and an outline of the depression. The popularity
function and the hypotheses are presented next, and the rest of the paper
explains the results.
2 Similarities in Political Structure and Economic
Development
2.1 The Political Structure
Finnish and Swedish politico-economic structures are rather similar. Both
countries are Nordic welfare states, and the maintenance of their welfare
states means high tax rates and, thus, small income diﬀerences. Consen-
sual procedures in the political system, a high-level of social security, a high
organization rate in the labor market, a high share of government in GDP
and a stable political system are all characteristic of these two countries.
The party structure consists of Þve party types: leftist, social democratic,
agrarian, liberal and rightist. In addition, a high share of the vote for, and
popularity of, the respective Social Democratic parties is typical. The pop-
ularity of the four biggest parties is shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Until 1991, Finland was governed by a coalition of the Social Democratic
Party and the National Coalition. Sweden was governed by the Social Demo-
cratic Party. For the next 3 to 4 years there were right-wing governments
in both countries. The right-wing governments coincided with the deepest
phase of the crisis, and the incumbent coalitions changed in both countries
after the crisis. Sweden returned to Social Democratic one-party minority
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government, and, in Finland, the so-called rainbow coalition was formed.
This coalition included parties from the left and the right and also included
the Greens, leaving out only one big party, namely, the Center Party. The
incumbent parties are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Government parties1 in Finland and Sweden.
Finland Sweden
1987-1991 NC, SDP, SSPP, FRP 1987-1990 SDP
1991-1995 NC, CENT, SSPP, CD 1991-1994 MP, CENT, LP, CD
1995-1999 NC, SDP, LA, GL, SSPP 1994-1998 SDP
1999-2001 NC, SDP, LA, GL, SSPP 1998-2001 SDP
In order to compare the results, the parties have to be ideologically close
to each other. Table 2 shows that from 1970 to 1990 the biggest parties
in Finland and Sweden were close to each other on a left-right spectrum
(Gilljam and Oscarsson, 1996). These ratings suggest that the popularity
changes of parties other than Social Democratic Parties can also be com-
pared.
Table 2. Party positions on the left-right-wing spectrum2.
Party Finland Sweden
Left Alliance/Left Party 1.8 2.6
Social Democratic Party 3.7 3.9
Center Party 5.4 6.1
National Coalition/Moderate Party 7.5 7.5
1NC (National Coalition), SSPP (Swedish Speaking Peoples Party), SDP (Social
Democratic Party), FRP (Finnish Rural Party), CP (Finnish Centre Party/Centre
Party), LA (Left Alliance), GL (Green League), MP (Moderate Party), LP (Liberal
Party), CD (Christian Democratic Party/Christian Democrats).
2On the spectrum 1 denotes the farthest position on the left and 10 the farthest
position on the right.
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2.2 The Economic Crisis of the 1990’s3
Cyclical behavior in Finland and Sweden has always been highly correlated
due to similar production structures in both countries. The economic crisis
was far deeper in Finland than it was in Sweden, but the following outline
of the crisis applies to both countries. Typical of the crisis was that no-
body could forecast the huge decline in economic growth. Furthermore, this
was a combination of bad luck and bad policies (Honkapohja and Koskela,
1999). The depression had its roots in the overheated economy of the end
of the 1980s. Deregulation of the capital and credit markets began in the
mid-1980s. New regulation allowed foreign debt for households and non-
exporting Þrms. The saving rate approached zero and consumer expecta-
tions were optimistic. Furthermore, Þscal policy was not particularly restric-
tive. Tax deductible interest payments for households and companies favored
debt Þnancing of consumption and investment. Due to the above-mentioned
factors and a fall in export demand, caused by a world-wide economic down-
turn and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the current account deÞcit grew
and subsequently became a problem. The maintenance of Þxed exchange
rates whilst experiencing current account deÞcits and amidst expectations
of devaluation forced the central banks to increase interest rates.
The interest rate rise and the later inevitable devaluation led many
debtors to sell their properties, which resulted in deßation, especially in
the real estate market. Unsound company Þnancing produced bankruptcies
and credit losses. Unemployment increased, economic growth fell, and a
banking crisis followed. In welfare states, the balancing eﬀect of automatic
stabilizers results in an accumulation of public sector debt.
As the crisis took its Þrst steps, Finland and Sweden aimed at abandon-
ing the Nordic inßation model with its competing devaluations4. Following
3This chapter is based on Holmlund (2002), Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), Lindbeck
(1997) and Vartia and Kiander (1998).
4From the 1960s to the 1990s, both countries exploited the opportunity to devalue
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Sweden, Finland pegged the markka to the ecu in June 1991 at the prevail-
ing exchange rate. Because of current account deÞcits, high foreign debts,
rising unemployment, and Þxed exchange rate, the Þnancial markets lost
conÞdence in the two countries ability to cope with the crisis. As a result
the currencies pegged to the ecu were attacked in the autumn 1991. The
next time the markka came under serious attack was during the EMS cri-
sis in September 1992. Then the markka was allowed to ßoat, and Sweden
devalued the krona two months later. These devaluations helped export
industries lead the two economies out of the crisis.
Despite the crisis having similar causes, the stabilization policies and
the recovery that followed were diﬀerent in Finland and Sweden. The coun-
tries adopted tight Þscal policies as part of a new economic policy paradigm
which aimed at reaching EU membership convergence criteria. In Finland,
the government downsized its Þnancing of municipal governments, which led
to cuts in public services. In Sweden, a policy decision was made to avoid
cuts in public services. In Finland, cutbacks in public expenditure had more
weight than tax increases in the countrys consolidation policy. In Sweden,
these two policies had a Þfty-Þfty share in the stabilization policy. In Fin-
land, the cutbacks and the decisions on savings in public sector expenditures
were mostly made in the early 1990s by a right-wing government, whereas
in Sweden in 1994-95 they were made by the Social Democratic government.
(Kautto, 2001) In Sweden, the government incurred greater debt in order to
Þnance welfare provision. Thus, the average Swede did not suﬀer as much
from the economic crisis. Open unemployment never rose above 10% in
Sweden, whereas in Finland it reached almost 20%. Unemployment started
to decline faster in Finland than in Sweden. The Finnish and Swedish un-
employment rates are plotted in Figure 3.
their currencies as the competitiveness of export industries decreased. This is the so-called
Nordic inßation model (see e.g. Jacobsson, 2003).
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Figure 1. Party popularity in Finland.
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Figure 2. Party popularity in Sweden.
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The nature of unemployment changed over the years as production tech-
nology experienced a structural change. The leading role of the paper, pulp,
and metal industries was gradually taken over by the electronic industry.
The latter needs diﬀerent kinds of skills and schooling than those required
in the metal and paper industries. This mismatch caused a high level of
structural unemployment. Service industries have also played a big part
in the creation of new jobs. (Koskela and Uusitalo, 2003) The depression
brought the economy into public focus for at least a decade.
1990 1995 2000
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
Finnish unemployment rate Swedish unemployment rate 
Figure 3. Seasonally adjusted unemployment rates in Finland and Sweden.
3 Estimation of the Popularity Equation
3.1 The Linear Model
First, we estimate a linear regression model for the whole period. Second,
we divide the data into three subperiods in order to examine changes in
the economy-popularity relationship. The subperiods, that is, before-the-
crisis, the crisis, and after-the-crisis, roughly coincide with the incumbency
periods. The exact periods and the number of observations in each period
are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. The exact subperiods and number of observations in each period.
Period Finland Sweden
9/1987-9/1990 32 36
10/1990-9/1995 53 55
10/1995-10/2001 63 67
Total 148 158
The popularity function has the standard linear formulation as follows:
(1) Pt = β0+β1Pt−1+β2It+β3Ut+
Pp
i=1 β4iPolit+
Pg
i=1 β5iGDit+Pr
i=1 β6iTit + εt.
On the left hand side there is the popularity (Pt) of the party in question (
Finnish: left-wing Alliance, Social Democratic Party, Center Party, National
Coalition Party, Swedish: left-wing Party, Social Democratic Party, Center
Party, Moderate Party) and on the right hand side is its first lag (Pt−1) with
other explanatory economic and political variables5.
Unemployment and economic growth are essential indicators of the depth
of an economic crisis. Because of the strong correlation between these in-
dicators, including both in the same regression equation may cause multi-
collinearity, and estimating their separate influences would be diﬃcult. We
have decided on unemployment since it is more visible from the point of
view of the average voter. We have used both seasonally adjusted and non-
seasonally adjusted unemployment rates. The results for both seasonally
adjusted unemployment and non-seasonally adjusted unemployment did not
diﬀer crucially from each other. The results reported here were obtained us-
ing the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. Inflation (I) is the 12-month
change in the cost of living index. We apply one lag for both economic vari-
ables because of a delay in publishing the statistics. The model is
5The Finnish popularity ratings are from Taloustutkimus, and the Swedish, from SIFO.
Economic data is from OECD Statistics for both countries.
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completed with political variables (Polit) which highlight the signiÞcance of
atypical, one-oﬀ political events like a change of party leader, referendums,
and municipal elections. Most political events are coded as dummies thus
creating asymmetry in explanatory power between the economic and the po-
litical variables. The incumbency periods are denoted by dummies (GDit).
Time-related variables (Tit) expose trends, cycles, and abrupt changes in
popularity levels. A trend variable is created for the Left Alliance to de-
tect the universal fall in the popularity of leftist ideology. We estimate the
popularity function for each party separately. All the applied political vari-
ables are listed in the Appendix in Tables 1 and 2. Below the tables is a
list of economic variables that did not have a signiÞcant inßuence on party
popularity and were, thus, excluded from the models.
Overall, we expect that unemployment had a more decisive role in changes
in popularity than inßation because that variable had more ßuctuations,
received a lot of attention in the media, and well delineates the develop-
ment of the crisis. The responsibility hypothesis states that incumbents
are punished for rising and/or high unemployment, whilst the issue-priority
hypothesis says that voters turn to left-wing parties in order to Þnd a way
out of unemployment. At the time unemployment began to rise fast, the
government consisted of right-wing parties; thus, it is diﬃcult to tell which
hypothesis the results support.
We expect that diﬀerences in the levels of unemployment between the
two countries matter in terms of the results. The eﬀect of unemployment is
greater for Finnish parties than for Swedish parties simply because unem-
ployment increased faster in Finland and to a higher level than in Sweden.
This larger inßuence should be more pronounced in the crisis period. Fur-
thermore, we expect that the incumbents would not be as severely punished
in Sweden as in Finland.
In reporting the results, we move from Finland to Sweden and from the
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whole period to subperiods. Our estimation method for the linear model is
OLS. Of the regression results, we report the coeﬃcients with their signiÞ-
cances, standard errors, and some test statistics. The results are displayed
in detail in the Appendix in Tables 4-11.
3.2 Results with the Linear Model
3.2.1 Finnish Results
Our main result is that unemployment had a statistically signiÞcant negative
inßuence on the popularity of the National Coalition, but a positive inßuence
on the popularity of left-wing parties, all at the 1% level of signiÞcance. In-
ßation had a negative inßuence on the popularity of the National Coalition,
again at the 1% level of signiÞcance, but a positive inßuence on the Left Al-
liances popularity at the 10% level of signiÞcance. Overall, unemployment
had a stronger inßuence than inßation on the popularity of left-wing parties,
but the opposite is true for the National Coalition. Clearly, this result sup-
ports the partisan hypothesis. The National Coalition is held responsible
for economic developments in the period under study. This should not come
as a surprise as the party has been a member of every coalition and has held
the position of Þnance minister since 1991.
The only party whose popularity was not aﬀected by the economic vari-
ables was the Center Party. There is autocorrelation in the residuals, but
the economic coeﬃcients remain non-signiÞcant even when robust standard
errors were applied. However, a quick look at the results for the periods
shows that unemployment had a negative coeﬃcient at the 5% level of sig-
niÞcance in every regression. Obviously, these results suggest that our linear
model does not Þt the Center Party data.
The government dummies indicate that, most of the time, parties pay
the price of ruling. However, in the right-wing government as well as in the
rainbow coalition, the incumbent parties were aﬀected diﬀerently by unem-
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ployment. In the right-wing government, the Center Party was punished for
unemployment and in the rainbow coalition, it was the National Coalition
that was so punished. In addition, in two cases the inßuence contradicts
the usual hypothesis. In 1987-91 the Social Democratic Partys incumbency
increases its support, whilst the Left Alliance is favored for being the incum-
bent since 1999. For the Left Alliance, being included in the government
may raise its status among the other parties. Having the post of the second
Þnance minister in particular gives the party credibility as regent.
We applied several political dummy variables, but most of them did
not have a signiÞcant inßuence on party popularity. All the political vari-
ables are listed in the Appendix in Table 1. However, there is one variable
that had an inßuence on the popularity of two parties; namely the 10/96
-variable. In October 1996, we had several one-oﬀ events that may have
aﬀected party approval ratings. Firstly, the markka joined the ERM system
with a Þxed exchange rate. Secondly, the Social Democratic Partys minister
was suspected of leaking information that would weaken Finlands position
in the ERM negotiations. Thirdly, there were municipal elections which
the Center Party usually wins. Our results show that these events aﬀected
the popularity of the right-wing parties in a positive way, but it is diﬃcult
to identify which events caused the increase in popularity. Other political
and event dummies which had a signiÞcant inßuence were the trend variable
(Left Alliance), a change of party leader (a positive inßuence on the Social
Democratic Party), the membership application for the European Union (a
negative inßuence on the Social Democratic Party) and the Center Partys
labor market reform proposal (a suggestion to increase ßexibility in the labor
market had a negative inßuence on its popularity).
The period results show that the signs and signiÞcance of economic vari-
ables vary from period to period. Between the Þrst and the second periods
the signs of unemployment and inßation alternate in 4 cases out of 8, whilst
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between the second and the third periods the respective number is 5. In
the Þrst period, there is only one statistically signiÞcant economic variable,
whereas in the second and third period there are 4 and 3 respectively. Thus,
the importance of economic variables in determining party popularity in-
creases. Our results indicate that in times of economic crisis the voters
tend to favor left-wing parties. The reason may lie in their opposition sta-
tus from 1991 to 1995, or in the policies the parties promised for handling
unemployment.
3.2.2 Swedish Results
Our results for the Swedish parties are less clear-cut. In the results for the
whole period under review there are three statistically signiÞcant economic
coeﬃcients, of which just one is at the 5% level of signiÞcance with the
others having lower levels of signiÞcance. It seems that inßation aﬀects
the popularity of left-wing parties negatively at a 10% level of signiÞcance,
and unemployment aﬀects the Moderate Party positively at 1% level of
signiÞcance. This is obviously the opposite result to the one predicted by the
partisan hypothesis. In addition, it is remarkable that the Moderate Partys
popularity did not suﬀer from unemployment although it was incumbent
during the worst phase of the crisis. We oﬀer two explanations for this. First,
the timing and content of crisis policies may matter. In fact, most of the
decisions on savings in public sector expenditures and cuts in transfers were
made after the Moderate Partys incumbency. Second, the Moderate Party
might be seen as the only real alternative to the Social Democratic Party
which has long had a hegemonic position in Swedish politics culminating in
one-party minority governments.
Without exception, each and every party pays the price of ruling, partic-
ularly the Social Democratic Party. Several political variables were included
in the popularity functions, but only two had a signiÞcant inßuence. A com-
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plete list of the political variables used is in the Appendix in Table 2. The
popularity of the Social Democratic Party suﬀers from its ministers credit
card problems, at the 5 % level of signiÞcance, and beneÞts from a change
of Prime Minister at the 1 % level of signiÞcance.
These results do not change much when the same equations are estimated
using the data for the subperiods. The signs of the economic variables vary
in the analysis of the periods. Between the Þrst and the second periods the
signs change 4 times, and between the second and third, two times. There
is only one statistically signiÞcant economic variable in each partys results.
In the Þrst period, inßation negatively aﬀects the popularity of the Social
Democratic Party, and unemployment positively aﬀects the popularity of
the Left Party, both at the 10% level of signiÞcance. In the second period,
inßation has a positive inßuence on the Center Party, at the 5% level of
signiÞcance. In the third period, unemployment has a positive inßuence on
the Moderate Partys popularity, at the 1% level of signiÞcance.
It is diﬃcult to Þnd either a systematic pattern in the inßuence of eco-
nomic variables on party popularity in Sweden, or clear support for any of
the common hypotheses. For most parties, lagged popularity accounts for
a considerable amount of their popularity. Thus, absorbing the likely in-
ßuence of other variables. Party popularity is changed by something other
than economic development. Thus, we can conclude that in Sweden it is
no use for the incumbents to try and create political business cycles as poll
respondents (i.e. the voters) are not aﬀected by the economy.
3.2.3 Comparison of the Results
In total, there are Þve signiÞcant economic variable coeﬃcients in the Finnish
results for the whole period and three, in the Swedish results. The same Þg-
ures for the subperiod coeﬃcients are 8 and 4. A comparison of the sister-
parties shows that the Left Alliance and the National Coalition are more
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strongly inßuenced by the economy than the Left Party and the Moderate
Party. Both the Social Democratic Parties are aﬀected by the economy, but
in diﬀerent ways. In Finland, the popularity of the Social Democratic Party
increases with rising unemployment, but is not signiÞcantly inßuenced by
inßation, whereas in Sweden the popularity of its sister-party is negatively
inßuenced by both unemployment and inßation, but only inßation has a sig-
niÞcant coeﬃcient. The Center Parties in both countries are not inßuenced
by the economy in the entire sample period.
In Finland, the examination of the periods shows that unemployment
had a signiÞcant inßuence in 6 regressions, whereas in Sweden, in just 2 re-
gressions and in most cases it is only barely signiÞcant. A closer look shows
that in Finland, not only are the unemployment coeﬃcients for the parties
larger, but they also have higher levels of signiÞcance. Inßation aﬀects pop-
ularity signiÞcantly in two whole period regressions in both countries. In
the period analysis in Finland there are two signiÞcant coeﬃcients and in
Sweden, three.
Ultimately, the most striking result is that the economic variables dur-
ing and after the depression had an opposite inßuence in Finland and in
Sweden. The inßuence of the economic variables is negative for Finnish
right-wing parties, but positive for Swedish ones. A similar pattern is found
for left-wing parties. In Finland, left-wing parties are positively inßuenced
by economic variables, when they are statistically signiÞcant, whereas in
Sweden they are not. It appears that the incumbents during the depres-
sion period in Finland are severely punished for their policies, but that in
Sweden this is not the case. The reasons for this may lie in the depth of
the depression, and the contents, and success, of the policies practiced. In
addition, one reason for the weak inßuence of economic variables on the
Swedish Social Democratic Partys popularity may be the tradition of one-
party minority governments. Voters know that the party needs the support
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of other parties to pass legislation and, thus, is not the only actor to be held
responsible.
3.3 The Threshold Model
The results above show that respondents evaluate the parties, with respect
to the economy, diﬀerently in diﬀerent periods. In other words, there is
instability in the estimated economic coeﬃcients. In empirical popularity
function literature, coeﬃcient instability has become a central issue (e.g.
Paldam, 1991, Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). It is understandable that in
an ever-changing world the inßuence of the economy on party popularity
varies. Admitting to instability opens up a huge amount of new research
opportunities for the Þeld. Thus, our next task is to model the instability
found. Our attempt is based on the assumption that voters are likely to rate
parties diﬀerently under good and bad economic circumstances. According
to previous results, the unemployment rate seems to be the most inßuential
variable, and its inßuence varies from period to period and from positive to
negative to zero. Hence, we assume that there exists a level of unemployment
that splits the observations into two regimes between which the inßuence of
unemployment alternates from positive to negative. Our previous results
were obtained by matching the subsamples with the electoral periods. In
the following, the aim is to let the data determine the subsample selection
criteria. In the search for the split point, we employ a threshold method
originally proposed by Tong (1983, 1990). This one threshold, one threshold
variable -model provides a simple nonlinear alternative6. Another advantage
6In Asikainen (2000) we have tested the suitability of another nonlinear alternative,
namely, Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994).
LSTR was chosen because it assumes that small values of unemployment have a diﬀerent
kind of eﬀect than large values. The slow and smooth transition was also considered an
advantage. The applied LM-test (Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994) does not reject the assumption
of linearity probably because of the small number of observations in the data set.
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of this model is that the threshold is endogenous, that is, it is estimated
along with the other parameters of the model7. The general presentation of
the threshold regression model is as follows:
(2) yt =
Pk
i=1 β1ixit + et, qt−d ≤ γ,
(3) yt =
Pk
i=1 β2ixit + et, qt−d > γ.
The relationship between the dependent (yt) and the explanatory (xit)
variables is supposed to change according to the value (γ) of the threshold
variable (qt−d), and the error term (et) is assumed independently, and iden-
tically distributed. The null hypothesis states that there is no threshold.
Thus, β1i = β2i for all i, which makes the model linear. Despite the fact
that the whole data set is used in the estimations, the threshold is looked
for in the mid 70% range of all observations, since 15% of the observations
from both top and bottom ends are excluded. This trimming guarantees
the identification of the model for all thresholds. We proceed in the fol-
lowing way. Firstly, the model is estimated by OLS, assuming linearity.
Secondly, the data is sorted in descending order, according to the threshold
variable. This rearrangement transforms the threshold model estimation
into a change point model estimation. Thirdly, the data is divided into two
regimes at each value of the threshold parameter, and the linear model is
estimated separately in both regimes. The sums of squared residuals (SSR)
from both estimations are added up. The estimated threshold is the one
that minimizes the sum of the SSRs. The OLS results include a test for
residual heteroskedasticity and according to that test, the significance of
the threshold is tested by either F-test (homoskedastic errors) or LM-test
(heteroskedastic errors). An essential part of the method is the calculation
of bootstrap probability values for the LM- and F-tests. Bootstraped
7 In the estimation of the threshold model, we apply a Gauss procedure coded by
Hansen. The Gauss code is available on Hansen’s www-page. The code was used in
Hansen (1996).
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values are needed since the threshold is not identiÞed under the null hy-
pothesis, and, thus, the usual probability distributions are not applicable.
After the threshold point is found, the data is divided into two regimes.
The two regimes are separately estimated by OLS. In the interpretation of
the results, attention is paid to the p-values and the coeﬃcients in the two
regimes.
As previously mentioned, we apply lagged unemployment as the thresh-
old variable. This popularity equation diﬀers from the popularity function
described earlier (see page 12) by excluding political, incumbency, and trend
variables because there are quite a lot of variables included in the model, and
the number of observations is not very high. In addition, we do not expect
the inßuence of one-oﬀ political events on party popularity to be aﬀected by
the threshold. The exact threshold model is speciÞed as follows:
(4) Pt = (α0 + α1Pt−1 + α2It−1 + α3Ut−1)I(Ut−d ≤
˜
U)
+(β0 + β1Pt−1 + β2It−1 + β3Ut−1)I(Ut−d >
˜
U) + εt
where I(·) is an indicator function, which receives a value of 1 when the
condition in the parentheses is true. d is the threshold lag,
˜
U is the threshold
value, but otherwise the symbols are the same as before. We expect that
there is a threshold for each party, that it diﬀers from party to party, and
that there are diﬀerences between the countries in the results. Drawing
on our previous results on the partisan divide regarding unemployment, we
expect that in Finland, in a regime of high unemployment, left-wing parties
are positively inßuenced by unemployment and that right-wing parties are
negatively aﬀected. In Sweden, we expect the opposite.
3.4 Results with the Threshold Model
Detailed results on the threshold estimations are listed in the Appendix in
Tables 12-21. In Finland, the estimated thresholds are signiÞcant for the
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Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance, whilst for the other two,
the Center Party and the National Coalition, they are very close to being
signiÞcant with levels of 0.1 and 0.12, respectively (see Table 4.). The results
are also similar for left-wing parties: in the presence of high unemployment
(above 10.7 % for the LA, 12.8 % for the SDP), the popularity of left-wing
parties increases. These results clearly support the partisan hypothesis that
voters turn to left-wing parties when unemployment is high. The results
for the National Coalition and the Center Party seem to be more mixed.
The results for the Center Party, the National Coalition, and the Social
Democratic Party have one feature in common: the economic variables may
have either a negative or positive inßuence, but the inßuence of inßation
and unemployment is in the same direction.
For the National Coalition, unemployment has to reach high levels (15.1%)
in order for it to lose its negative inßuence (at the 1% level of signiÞcance) on
the partys popularity, above that it has a non-signiÞcant positive inßuence.
A comparison of the course of unemployment and the National Coalitions
popularity ratings reveals that when unemployment is above 15.1%, the
popularity of the National Coalition is at its lowest level. Thus, it might be
reasonable to assume that at that point in time only its core supporters are
left - those who believe in the values of the party and who remain unshaken
by the bad economy. For the Center Party, unemployments inßuence on
its popularity becomes negative when it rises above 12.2%. When the un-
employment rate lies between 12.2% and 15.1%, both unemployment and
inßation have a negative inßuence on right-wing parties. During most of
their shared incumbency period, the unemployment rate was within these
limits.
In general, when economic variables have a signiÞcant coeﬃcient, their
level of signiÞcance is always high (at the 1% level). One feature of these
results that Þts all the parties, except the National Coalition, is that when
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unemployment is below the thresholds indicated, it has no signiÞcant inßu-
ence, and the coeﬃcients are close to zero. It seems that high unemployment
triggers worries about the economy among the voters, and makes them eval-
uate the parties according to the economic performance. Table 4. sets out
the threshold values and their signiÞcance for Finnish parties.
Table 4. Values of the threshold points for diﬀerent parties, LM-test for het-
eroskedastic errors, F-test for homoskedastic errors and their bootstrap p-values in
Finland.
Party Threshold LM/F-test p-value
NC 15.1 15.35 (F) 0.10
CENT 12.2 14.92 (F) 0.12
SDP 12.8 34.98 (F) 0.00
LA 10.7 48.87 (F) 0.00
In Sweden, the estimated thresholds are signiÞcant for right-wing par-
ties and almost signiÞcant for the Left Party. For right-wing parties, when
unemployment crosses the threshold its sign does not change, but alternates
from non-signiÞcant to signiÞcant. For the Left Party, unemployment has
a positive inßuence below the threshold, at the 1% level of signiÞcance,
whereas above the threshold it has a non-signiÞcant (negative) inßuence.
In Sweden, the threshold points have lower values than the respective
Finnish ones. Further comparison indicates that the threshold points in the
Finnish results are higher than Swedish unemployment ever was, in the pe-
riod under study. Maybe unemployment never rose high enough to create
signiÞcant thresholds. In addition, the large autoregressive term may have
absorbed the inßuence of the other variables. The only other meaningful
conclusion is that, whether high or low, unemployment does not seem to be
the driving factor behind party fortunes in Sweden. These results suggest
that the chosen way of modelling nonlinearity better Þts the Finnish party
data. For the Swedish data, the linear model might be adequate, but atten-
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tion has to be paid to possible outlier observations. The threshold values for
each party and their signiÞcance are found in Table 5.
Table 5. Values of the threshold points for diﬀerent parties, LM-test for het-
eroskedastic errors, F-test for homoskedastic errors and their bootstrap p-values in
Sweden.
Party Threshold LM/F-test p-value
MP 8.3 17.07 (F) 0.06
CENT 2.0 16.97 (LM) 0.00
SDP 3.4 9.41 (LM) 0.27
LP 7.6 15.02 (F) 0.11
4 Conclusions
Our results conÞrm expected diﬀerences in the economic approval of parties
in Finland and Sweden. Finnish and Swedish sister-parties are inßuenced in
opposite ways by the economy. Swedish left-wing parties (the Social Demo-
cratic Party, the Left Party) are negatively aﬀected by unemployment and
inßation but their Finnish counterparts (the Social Democratic Party, the
Left Alliance) are positively inßuenced by the same variables. The popular-
ity of the National Coalition falls when unemployment and inßation increase,
but in Sweden the Moderate Partys popularity increases along with rising
unemployment.
Analysis of the subdivided data suggests that in Finland the importance
of economic variables in determining party popularity increases over time. In
addition, the period results show that the signs and signiÞcance of economic
variables alternate from period to period. Our results indicate that in times
of economic crisis the voters tend to favor left-wing parties either because
they just happen to be opposition parties or because their suggested policies
are preferred to those of the government. In the right-wing government,
it is the Center Party that is punished for unemployment, whilst in the
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rainbow coalition it is the National Coalition. The popularity of Finnish left-
wing parties is aﬀected similarly by unemployment, whereas the popularity
of right-wing parties is similarly aﬀected only when they are government
coalition partners. Overall, our results with the linear model support both
the responsibility and the partisan hypotheses because during the time that
unemployment rose right-wing parties were incumbents. Thus it is diﬃcult
to tell whether the reduction in approval ratings follows the responsibility
hypothesis or the partisan hypothesis.
In Sweden, there seems to be no systematic pattern in the inßuence of
economic variables on party popularity. In addition, neither the responsi-
bility nor the partisan hypothesis is supported by the results. The Swedish
results more or less contradict the partisan hypothesis as inßation negatively
aﬀects the popularity of left-wing parties and unemployment has a positive
inßuence on the Moderate Party. The lagged popularity in every regression
accounts for a large share of the popularity, thus absorbing the inßuence of
other variables. We can conÞdently conclude that the economy is not the
driving factor behind party popularity. Hence, in Sweden the incumbent
parties do not beneÞt from creating political business cycles.
Overall, it seems that the incumbents during the depression period in
Finland and in Sweden have opposite experiences regarding getting punished
for their policies. In Finland, the governing parties are severely punished
for their policies, but in Sweden this is not the case. At least part of this
diﬀerence might be explained by the diﬀerences in the depth of the depres-
sion, and the contents and success of the policies practiced. Diﬀerences in
timing of the decisions on public sector savings and cuts in transfers proba-
bly can be counted to explanatory factors. In Sweden, most of the decisions
on public sector savings and cuts in transfers were made in 1994-95 by the
Social Democratic government, whereas in Finland most of the cuts and
decisions on public sector savings were made earlier by a right-wing gov-
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ernment. Finally, the diﬀerences in the government coalition may play a
part. In Sweden, in the period under study, the Social Democratic Party
has governed as one-party minority government for years. To function prop-
erly one-party minority government needs the support from other parties to
pass legislation, and, thus, it is not the only actor to be held responsible.
We address the found coeﬃcient instability in the linear model by estab-
lishing a threshold model in each partys popularity function. The thresh-
old variable we apply is unemployment. These results clearly support the
partisan hypothesis that support for left-wing parties increases when unem-
ployment is high. However, unemployment needs to be high (11-15%) to
inßuence signiÞcantly Finnish party popularity. The only exception to this
is the National Coalition whose popularity suﬀers from unemployment all
the time. When the unemployment rate lies between 12.2% and 15.1%, both
unemployment and inßation have a negative inßuence on right-wing parties.
During most of their shared incumbency period, the unemployment rate
was within these limits. When unemployment is high (above 11-13%), it in-
creases left-wing parties popularity. There is no doubt that unemployment
is the major economic variable when it comes to explaining party popular-
ity in Finland. It seems that high unemployment triggers worries about the
economy among the voters, and makes them evaluate the parties according
to the economys performance.
The Swedish results are much more diﬃcult to interpret and make it
diﬃcult to arrive at satisfactory conclusions. Either the thresholds are not
signiÞcant (the Left Party, the Social Democratic Party) or the number
of observations in the regimes is very low (the Center Party, the Moder-
ate Party). Maybe the large autoregressive term in the Swedish popularity
function estimations absorbs the inßuence of the other variables. Maybe un-
employment never rose high enough to reveal the thresholds in the Swedish
popularity functions.
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Appendix
Table 1. Political variables, acronyms and deÞnitions for Finnish data.
Acronym DeÞnitions of Dummy Variables Timing Obs.
CPLCENT Change of party leader, Cent 6/1990 29
ECUFIX Markka Þxed to Ecu 6/1991 41
CSU Attempted coup in Soviet Union 8/1991 42
EUAPPL Application for membership in EU 3/1992 49
FIMFLO Markka to ßoat 9/1992 54
MEL Municipal elections, SDP won 10/1992 56
CPLSDP Change of party leader, SDP 6/1993 63
CPLNC Change of party leader, NC 8/1994 76
REFEU Referendum on EU membership 10/1994 77
10/96 Municipal elections 10/1996 98
10/96 Markka Þxed to ERM 10/1996 98
10/96 SDP Minister suspected of info
leaks on ERM decision 10/1996 98
LAD LA disunity on EMU 12/1997 110
CPLLA Change of party leader, LA 5/1998 116
LREF Labor market reform, Cent 11/1998 122
HU Party leaders sabbatical, Cent 4/2000 136
Table 2. Political variables, acronyms and deÞnitions for Swedish data.
Acronym DeÞnitions of Dummy Variables Timing Obs.
CPLCENT Change of party leader, Cent 6/1987 2
GCRISIS Government crisis 2/1990 32
ECUFIX Krona Þxed to Ecu 5/1991 44
EUAPPL Membership application to EU 7/1991 46
KROFLO Krona to ßoat 11/1992 60
PLGCENT Party leader left-wing govt, Cent 8/1994 80
REFEU Referendum on EU membership 11/1994 82
EUPEL European Parliament election 9/1995 91
MONA Minister has credit problems, SDP 10/1995 93
CPMSDP Change of PM, SDP 3/1996 97
NEMUSDP Govt says no to EMU, SDP 6/1997 111
CPLCENT98 Change of party leader, Cent 6/1998 122
CPLMP Change of party leader, MP 8/1999 135
List of all tested economic variables which turned out to have a non-signiÞcant
inßuence: inßation measured as consumer price index, and consumer price index
for food, consumer conÞdence index, base rate, 3-month rate, share price index,
government debt, employment rate.
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Table 3. Acronyms and their deÞnitions used in all the tables.
Acronym DeÞnition
cons constant
(t-n) identiÞes the lag
GD government dummy
trend declining trend variable
U(t-n) unemployment
I(t-n) inßation (cost of living index)
R2 rate of explanation
LM residual autocorrelation
Normal residual normality
White residual heteroskedasticity
RESET functional form (Ramsey)
FINNISH RESULTS
Table 4. Results of popularity function for the Left Alliance.
LA 1987-2001 1987-90 1990-95 1995-2001
cons 6.16*** 12.43*** 7.59*** 4.75***
[0.77] [4.16] [1.37] [1.3]
LA(t-1) 0.04 -0.13 -0.07 0.40***
[0.08] [0.17] [0.14] [0.11]
GD9599 -0.15
[0.19]
GD99- 1.08***
[0.21]
Trend 0.13*** 0.17***
[0.01] [0.04]
U(t-1) 0.16*** -0.76 0.15** 0.02
[0.04] [0.74] [0.06] [0.07]
I (t-1) 0.13* -0.19 -0.07 0.19
[0.07] [0.33] [0.18] [0.13]
R2 0.75 0.78 0.38 0.27
LMa 0.23 0.07 0.41 1.25
Normalb 4.08 1.37 3.02 0.01
Whitec 0.88 1.25 0.78 0.91
RESETd 9.94*** 1.68 0.16 0.22
Residual tests: a autocorrelation (LM-test), b normality, c heteroskedasticity, d func-
tional form. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at
10%/5%/1% risk level.
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Table 5. Results of popularity function for the Social Democratic Party.
SDP 1987-2001 1987-90 1990-95 1995-2001
cons 6.85*** 20.75*** 1.38 12.54***
[1.37] [7.89] [2.05] [2.62]
SDP(t-1) 0.52*** 0.40* 0.72*** 0.38***
[0.07] [0.18] [0.07] [0.11]
GD8791 2.08***
[0.60]
GD9599 -1.44***
[0.37]
GD99- -0.29
[0.36]
CPLSDP 2.07 1.76
[1.26] [1.30]
EUAPPL -2.17* -1.65
[1.26] [1.26]
U(t-1) 0.48*** -0.94 0.38*** 0.22
[0.1] [0.81] [0.13] [0.13]
I (t-1) 0.07 -0.59 0.54* -0.09
[0.14] [0.53] [0.32] [0.22]
R2 0.87 0.21 0.93 0.44
LMa 1.33 0.08 0.21 0.5
Normalb 1.99 0.57 5.18* 1.57
Whitec 0.24 0.34 0.29 0.97
RESETd 11.73*** 0.09 3.15 0.05
Residual tests: a autocorrelation (LM-test), b normality, c heteroskedasticity, d func-
tional form. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at
10%/5%/1% risk level.
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Table 6. Results of popularity function for the Center Party.
CENT 1987-2001 1987-90 1990-95 1995-2001
cons 5.62*** 25.00*** 14.98*** 13.01***
[1.39] [7.17] [3.96] [2.91]
CENT(t-1) 0.76*** 0.19 0.41*** 0.51***
[0.05] [0.19] [0.13] [0.11]
GD9195 -0.73***
[0.27]
10/96 2.8** 2.70***
[1.11] [0.99]
WREF -1.81* -2.14**
[1.11] [0.99]
U(t-1) -0.04 -1.98** -0.28** -0.20**
[0.05] [0.77] [0.11] [0.09]
I (t-1) -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.18
[0.11] [0.44] [0.25] [0.18]
R2 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.67
LMa 6.09*** 0.71 0.88 2.84*
Normalb 0.63 2.09 3.46 0.74
Whitec 0.64 1.51 0.30 1.13
RESETd 0.06 0.29 1.34 0.17
Table 7. Results of popularity function for the National Coalition.
NC 1987-2001 1987-90 1990-95 1995-2001
cons 10.09*** 18.69*** 10.32*** 22.82***
[1.92] [5.30] [2.52] [4.42]
NC(t-1) 0.63*** 0.13 0.37*** 0.31**
[0.06] [0.18] [0.12] [0.12]
10/96 3.47*** 3.53
[1.01] [1.05]
U(t-1) -0.20*** 0.45 0.00 -0.65***
[0.05] [0.58] [0.06] [0.16]
I (t-1) -0.37*** -0.48 0.29 -0.88***
[0.11] [0.37] [0.18] [0.25]
R2 0.72 0.67 0.51 0.64
LMa 6.38*** 1.12 0.60 4.06**
Normalb 1.15 3.66 4.36 2.06
Whitec 1.16 0.27 0.36 0.91
RESETd 2.14 1.1 0.59 0.00
Residual tests: a autocorrelation (LM-test), b normality, c heteroskedasticity, d func-
tional form. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at
10%/5%/1% risk level.
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SWEDISH RESULTS
Table 8. Results of popularity function for the Left Party.
LP 1987-2001 1987-90 1990-95 1995-2001
cons 0.85** 0.28 -0.12 2.99**
[0.41] [1.55] [0.82] [1.24]
LP(t-1) 0.94*** 0.74*** 0.98*** 0.81***
[0.02] [0.14] [0.05] [0.07]
U(t-1) -0.02 0.08* 0.06 -0.09
[0.04] [0.59] [0.09] [0.09]
I (t-1) -0.06* 0.17 -0.01 -0.11
[0.03] [0.11] [0.06] [0.11]
R2 0.94 0.74 0.88 0.71
LMa 2.14 2.96* 5.19*** 0.21
Normalb 27.23*** 2.79 30.25*** 2.82
Whitec 1.84* 0.20 2.33** 0.62
RESETd 8.41*** 2.83 8.61*** 3.02*
Table 9. Results of popularity function for the Social Democratic Party.
SDP 1987-2001 1987-90 1990-95 1995-2001
cons 7.77*** 10.41* 2.00 7.28***
[1.75] [5.54] [2.47] [2.73]
SDP(t-1) 0.86*** 0.79*** 1.01*** 0.79***
[0.03] [0.10] [0.06] [0.07]
GD8791 -1.35**
[0.69]
GD9498 -2.36***
[0.60]
GD98- -2.54***
[0.66]
CPMSDP 4.53*** 4.27***
[1.59] [1.47]
MONA -3.31** -3.74**
[1.59] [1.49]
U(t-1) -0.08 0.61 -0.28 -0.03
[0.13] [0.98] [0.18] [0.13]
I (t-1) -0.15* -0.51* -0.10 0.17
[0.08] [0.24] [0.11] [0.17]
R2 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.70
LMa 1.67 0.84 0.17 0.65
Normalb 4.75* 0.67 1.17 3.04
Whitec 0.78 0.31 1.93 0.92
RESETd 0.58 0.16 0.91 0.00
Residual tests: a autocorrelation (LM-test), b normality, c heteroskedasticity, d func-
tional form. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at
10%/5%/1% risk level.
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Table 10. Results of popularity function for the Center Party.
CENT 1987-2001 1987-90 1990-95 1995-2001
cons 1.31*** 4.71** 3.43*** 1.03**
[0.41] [2.31] [0.94] [0.42]
CENT(t-1) 0.83*** 0.65*** 0.45*** 0.72***
[0.05] [0.13] [0.11] [0.11]
GD9194 -0.00
[0.18]
U(t-1) -0.05 -0.75 0.03 0.07
[0.04] [0.68] [0.07] [0.07]
I (t-1) 0.05 -0.03 0.12** 0.12
[0.04] [0.11] [0.05] [0.09]
R2 0.86 0.59 0.58 0.69
LMa 3.12** 0.20 1.39 0.51
Normalb 45.40*** 10.79*** 4.48 4.65
Whitec 1.75** 0.47 1.11 1.60
RESETd 2.30 0.13 0.66 0.00
Table 11. Results of popularity function for the Moderate Party.
MP 1987-2001 1987-90 1990-95 1995-2001
cons 2.46*** 2.46 1.19 3.73**
[0.81] [2.94] [1.79] [1.51]
MP(t-1) 0.86*** 0.74*** 0.91*** 0.77***
[0.04] [0.15] [0.07] [0.07]
GD9194 -0.96***
[0.34]
U(t-1) 0.19** 0.33 0.1 0.38***
[0.07] [0.89] [0.11] [0.14]
I (t-1) 0.04 0.38 0.05 0.12
[0.04] [0.24] [0.07] [0.14]
R2 0.90 0.78 0.81 0.83
LMa 0.91 0.67 2.36 0.44
Normalb 0.43 0.95 1.68 2.09
Whitec 1.21 1.56 0.61 4.08***
RESETd 0.02 0.05 0.25 4.96**
Residual tests: a autocorrelation (LM-test), b normality, c heteroskedasticity, d func-
tional form. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at
10%/5%/1% risk level.
68
THRESHOLD MODEL RESULTS
Table 12. P-values for threshold existence under diﬀerent assumptions on resid-
uals (H0 no threshold).
FIN LM het. errors F hom. errors
NC 0.17 0.1
CENT 0.18 0.12
SDP 0.00 0.00
LA 0.00 0.00
Table 13. P-values for threshold existence under diﬀerent assumptions on resid-
uals (H0 no threshold).
SWE LM het. errors F hom. errors
MP 0.29 0.06
CENT 0.00 0.00
SDP 0.27 0.42
LP 0.1 0.1
FINNISH RESULTS
Table 14. Results of the threshold model for the Left Alliance.
LA 1987-2001 U ≤ 10.7 U > 10.7
cons 2.79*** 3.01*** 5.57***
[0.75] [1.23] [0.99]
LA(t-1) 0.71*** 0.82*** -0.07
[0.06] [0.06] [0.13]
U(t-1) -0.01 -0.09 0.26***
[0.03] [0.07] [0.06]
I (t-1) 0.02 -0.14 0.08
[0.07] [0.11] [0.12]
R2 0.59 0.73 0.33
N 150 80 70
P 0.58
Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at 10%/5%/1%
risk level.
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Table 15. Results of the threshold model for the SDP.
SDP 1987-2001 U ≤ 12.8 U > 12.8
cons 2.61*** 13.51*** -1.89
[0.99] [2.39] [2.14]
SDP(t-1) 0.74*** 0.44*** 0.47***
[0.05] [0.09] [0.12]
U(t-1) 0.27*** -0.02 1.03***
[0.07] [0.09] [0.29]
I (t-1) 0.38*** -0.09 0.86***
[0.13] [0.15] [0.24]
R2 0.85 0.22 0.88
N 150 101 49
P 0.99
Table 16. Results of the threshold model for the Center Party.
CENT 1987-2001 U ≤ 12.2 U > 12.2
cons 5.47*** 3.9*** 21.4***
[1.45] [1.48] [4.91]
CENT(t-1) 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.36
[0.04] [0.06] [0.14]
U(t-1) -0.1*** 0.05 -0.55***
[0.04] [0.09] [0.16]
I (t-1) -0.12 0.11 -0.73***
[0.1] [0.16] [0.25]
R2 0.78 0.66 0.69
N 150 98 52
P 0.72
Table 17. Results of the threshold model for the National Coalition.
NC 1987-2001 U ≤ 15.1 U > 15.1
cons 10.57*** 13.08*** 7.34*
[1.98] [2.34] [4.29]
NC(t-1) 0.61*** 0.54*** 0.25
[0.06] [0.07] [0.24]
U(t-1) -0.21*** -0.26*** 0.31
[0.05] [0.07] [0.22]
I (t-1) -0.4*** -0.54*** 0.24
[0.11] [0.14] [0.24]
R2 0.69 0.61 0.273
N 150 123 27
P 0.72
Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at 10%/5%/1%
risk level.
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SWEDISH RESULTS
Table 18. Results of the threshold model for the Left Party.
LP 1987-2001 U ≤ 7.6 U > 7.6
cons 0.81* 0.04 2.39***
[0.41] [0.44] [3.55]
LP(t-1) 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.84***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.05]
U(t-1) -0.02 0.09*** -0.1
[0.04] [0.02] [0.39]
I (t-1) -0.06* -0.01 -0.22
[0.03] [0.03] [0.14]
R2 0.94 0.95 0.96
N 155 123 32
P 0.54
Table 19. Results of the threshold model for the SDP.
SDP 1987-2001 U ≤ 3.4 U > 3.4
cons 1.48 10.73** 2.28**
[0.95] [5.27] [1.11]
SDP(t-1) 0.96*** 0.77*** 0.95***
[0.02] [0.09] [0.03]
U(t-1) 0.003 0.74 -0.07
[0.07] [0.49] [0.1]
I (t-1) 0.005 -0.48** 0.15
[0.05] [0.22] [0.11]
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93
N 155 47 108
P 0.84
Table 20. Results of the threshold model for the Center Party.
CENT 1987-2001 U ≤ 2.0 U > 2.0
cons 1.33*** 3.44* 1.35***
[0.35] [2.06] [0.36]
CENT(t-1) 0.83*** 0.66*** 0.63***
[0.045] [0.12] [0.07]
U(t-1) -0.05 0.13 0.1***
[0.03] [0.77] [0.04]
I (t-1) 0.05 0.006 0.13***
[0.03] [0.07] [0.04]
R2 0.86 0.49 0.77
N 155 35 120
P 0.03
Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at 10%/5%/1%
risk level.
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Table 21. Results of the threshold model for the Moderate Party.
MP 1987-2001 U ≤ 8.3 U > 8.3
cons 1.56** 2.46*** -23.52*
[0.75] [0.77] [12.66]
MP(t-1) 0.92*** 0.87*** 1.19***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.12]
U(t-1) 0.06 0.09 2.15*
[0.06] [0.07] [1.27]
I (t-1) -0.002 0.01 0.18
[0.04] [0.04] [0.31]
R2 0.89 0.88 0.98
N 155 139 16
P 0.93
Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** = statistically signiÞcant at 10%/5%/1%
risk level.
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Abstract
We document the inßuence of local unemployment, political orienta-
tion and socio-economic background on individual citizens government
support in the 1990s. It seems that the inßuence of the local unemploy-
ment on the respondents government approval likelihood is somewhat
confusing. During the right government the high local unemployment does
not decrease respondents approval likelihood, but during the multi-party
government it does. An obvious explanation is derived from the Cen-
tre Partys dominant position in the rural, high unemployment regions.
Otherwise, our results support the class dealignment, the importance of
political orientation on the government support, the increased likelihood
of non-support if facing a risk of being less-well-oﬀ, and the positive atti-
tude towards the government of the youngs amidst all the turbulence in
the society.
Keywords: individual government approval, local unemployment
JEL ClassiÞcation: D72
1 Introduction
Monthly publication of the governments and parties popularity ratings receives
more and more attention in the media. Speculation arises on the factors and
events altering the ratings. Research on the factors changing the political actors
popularity has been part of economics and political science over three decades.
A widely acknowledged fact is that the economy to a remarkable degree drives
the government popularity. Unsurprisingly, unemployment is the most com-
mon economic variable to explain the government popularity, other inßuential
variables being inßation and incomes. Also in the Finnish evidence so far, the
national unemployment has been connected to the decline of the incumbent
popularity as well as to the increase of the popularity of the left parties.
Generally, the media report the overall, or aggregate, approval ratings. Only
lately, there has been a tendency towards a more detailed reporting. However,
any survey bears in itself almost innumerous aggregation possibilities since in
order to fulÞll the required representativeness, the pollster has to record various
individual qualities regarding the respondent. These qualities allow the survey
result to be presented either as an aggregate Þgure or as a group-wise result
where the responses are aggregated according to the desired background vari-
able. Availability of the individual-level data for research purposes has increased
over the years allowing new aspects of the political behavior to be explored.
Individual-level data caters for the possibility of appending the data with
additional variables. For example, when the respondents residential area can
be traced, then it is possible to connect the respondent to any local economic
indicator. This is one of the latest trends in the popularity research. Behind
the increased interest lies the diverging economic development within countries.
In this matter Finland has not been an exception. From 1991 to 1995, Finland
experienced the deepest peace-time depression ever. It created diﬀerences in the
economic conditions between individuals, socio-economic groups and provinces.
According to several measures there seems to have happened diverging economic
development not only between groups, but within groups, too. Hence, we wish to
Þnd out whether these diﬀerences are visible in the groupwise evaluations of the
government. In addition, we explore whether there exists within these groups
some subgroups which tend to approve diﬀerently. Particularly, the diverging
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local unemployment rates lead us to assume diverging approval behavior among
citizens from diﬀerent provinces. Basically, we assume that living in a province
with high unemployment lowers ones likelihood to approve of the government.
As the Þrst Finnish individual-level study, we wish to gain basic knowledge on
whether and how diﬀerent socio-economic and demographic qualities are linked
to ones approval decision.
In theory, the incumbents have been held accountable for the economic de-
velopment in the incumbency period since the publication of The Economic
Theory of Democracy by Downs (1957). The incumbent parties are punished
(rewarded) for bad (good) economic outcomes by voting against (for) them.
The Downsian responsibility theory assumes similar policy preferences for each
party, whereas the partisan approach (Hibbs, 1977) replaces that assumption
with one that allows diﬀerent economic policy preferences for the leftist and
rightist parties. The left parties are assumed to be more concerned about the
unemployment, the right parties about the inßation and growth. On the back-
ground lies the assumption of diﬀerent preferences between the parties core
voters. The assumed direction of inßuence is derived either from the traditional
class hypothesis or the connection goes via the voters preferences on income
redistribution, i.e. level of governments share in the economy. Ones propensity
to adverse economic shocks, like unemployment, leads one to favor redistribu-
tive politics and this propensity varies according to individual qualities. People
likely to experience the adversities are assumed to vote and approve similarly.
In the circumstances of the left (right) incumbent and increasing unemployment
(inßation), the voters and poll respondents have two response possibilities: 1)
to support the leftist (rightist) parties, since they are believed to be the only
able parties to tackle the unemployment (inßation) (Swank, 1993), 2) to punish
the left (right) incumbent, since it has not been able to tackle the unemploy-
ment (inßation) considered to be its top priority in the economy (salient goal
approach, Powell and Whitten, 1993).
Empirical testing of the incumbents responsibility started in the beginning
of the 1970s with the studies by Kramer (1971), Mueller (1970) and Goodhart
and Bhansali (1970). The basic idea in the operationalization of the respon-
sibility hypothesis is to explain the incumbents popularity rating by various
78
economic indicators and political events. This relationship is called the pop-
ularity function. Majority of the empirical popularity function studies applies
either the national aggregates or the individual indicators. In the latter, the
economic explanatory variables are based on the poll respondents own percep-
tions and reporting, whereas in the former, the objective economic indicators
are employed. Naturally, the subjective evaluation of ones own and the nations
economy may be biased due to the favorite partys incumbency (see e.g. Zaller,
2001).
Choice of the explanatory variables into the popularity function has brought
up interesting debates into the Þeld. The following questions have received the
most attention: What is the poll respondents economic reference group when
(s)he evaluates the incumbent, i.e. is the approval decision based on her/his own
pocketbook (egotropic approval) or does (s)he take the success of the national
economy into account (sociotropic approval)? Does (s)he judge the incumbent
by its performance so far (retrospective evaluation) or by what (s)he expects of
it (prospective evaluation)?1 The egotropic and sociotropic aspects of approval
were introduced by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979). To be able to detect the two
basis of approval from each other, one needs survey data with questions on the
respondents own economy and her/his perceptions on the national economy.
However, Kramer (1983) questioned the suitability of the survey data for dis-
tinguishing the changes in the economy in general and the changes caused by
the government. In addition, he suggested an intermediate aggregation between
the individual and the aggregate level. For along time there wasnt many to
follow his suggestion. Nowadays, there is a slightly increasing amount of studies
concentrating on the local economic conditions, regional political and social dif-
ferences and their inßuence on the political outcomes. In several studies on the
British elections, it is concluded either that the better the local economy is do-
ing, the higher the government support (Pattie and Johnston, 1995b), or more
exactly, the higher the regional unemployment, the lower the support for the
government (Pattie and Johnston, 1995a, Johnston et al., 2000). There is also
discussion whether controlling all the relevant individual qualities removes the
inter-regional variation in party or government support (Johnston and Pattie,
1For quite recent a review on the topics see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000).
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1998). In Britain, it does not seem to be so but the regional diﬀerences remain
inexplicable.
Not only local but also other disaggregate unemployment rates have been
linked to approval and vote choice. Overall, the results are mixed. For example
it is found that the group-speciÞc unemployment rates do not perform better
than the aggregate unemployment rate, when the popularity of the Swedish So-
cial Democratic Party is studied (Jonung and Wadensjö, 1987). Another aspect
to the groupwise diﬀerences is to test whether diﬀerent groups react diﬀerently
to the changes in the economy. There is empirical support for the partisan divide
in issues related to unemployment, real incomes and inßation in the US (Hibbs
et al. 1982a), whereas in Britain the voters sensitivity towards unemployment
and real incomes in evaluating the government follows the occupational divide
between blue-collars and white-collars (Hibbs et al. 1982b). On Irish data, it
is concluded that voters in lower social classes are concerned about unemploy-
ment, whereas in higher social classes they are concerned about interest rates
and changes in disposable incomes (Borooah and Borooah, 1990). In the older
age groups and in the lowest income group the popularity of the Swedish Social
Democratic Party is not aﬀected by economic variables but unemployment has
the biggest inßuence on party popularity in the middle-income group (Jonung
and Wadesjö, 1987). Thus, the international studies encourage us to apply the
local unemployment rates and estimate the diﬀerences between groups.
The previous Finnish studies concentrate on the aggregate level party and
government popularites. A connection between the national unemployment and
the aggregate approval rates of the Finnish government (Mattila, 1994, Nyberg
2000) and parties (Nyberg, 2000, Asikainen, 2002) is a common Þnding. In
addition, both the responsibility and the partisan hypothesis are supported.
The right incumbent parties are punished for increasing unemployment, whereas
the left parties gain support at the same time. Especially, the incumbents of
1991-95 (the Centre Party, the National Coalition) are severely punished for bad
economic development when aggregated unemployment is used as an indicator.
(Asikainen, 2002) Finland has been included in several Scandinavian multi-
country studies, where the results are either weak and inconsistent or that only
the left parties whether incumbent or not are aﬀected by the economy. (Mattila,
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1996, Pacek and Radcliﬀ, 1999)
The above mentioned results - the international evidence on the regional
and groupwise diﬀerences and the previous Finnish results - lead us to question
whether the regional divide exists in Finland and whether groups diﬀer from
each other in evaluating the government. The data used in looking for the
answers includes 15 surveys on the Finnish government popularity from 1992 to
2001. More speciÞcally, our research questions are the following.
1. Unemployment and approval. We apply local unemployment to test
whether the local circumstances matter, when it comes to approving of
the national government. Here we rely on the responsibility hypothesis;
no matter which government coalition reigns, it is expected to be punished
for the unemployment. In other words, we assume that the likelihood of
approving of the government is lower in the provinces with a high unem-
ployment rate. In addition, from 1995 to 2001, the surveys have included a
question of ones own labour market status. Our interest is to see whether
the behavior among the unemployed diﬀers crucially from others, i.e. do
they punish stronger the incumbents.
2. Groups and approval. All the socio-economic groups do not beneÞt
equally of the economic growth, just as not all the groups suﬀer simi-
larly in the recession. In Finland, we have comprehensive evidence on
the diﬀerences in the economic and social well-being between groups and
regions in the 1990s. But there is not yet evidence on the diﬀerences in
the government support between groups and regions. Our interest lies in
exploring whether there is a group or groups that very strongly disap-
prove of the government and whether that is related to their experiences
during the crisis. To complete our hypotheses, we apply the traditional
class voting hypothesis and preferences for income redistribution. Over-
all, we expect that those in a less-well-oﬀ or weakening position would
view the government more critically than others. In addition, we test our
hypotheses within groups divided by age, sex, education, income class,
occupational class, residential province, labor market status and vote in-
tention. Naturally, we do not expect all the groups to have signiÞcantly
divergent behavior.
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In the following, we Þrst present diﬀerent ways in which the regional divide
can come up and then outline the economic diﬀerences between groups in the
1990s. Our data is described in the Chapter 3. Chapter 4 begins with the
method and is followed by the results.
2 The Potential Role of the Economy
2.1 Regional Distinctiveness
In the following, we present features of the regional and groupwise economic
development that gives us a cause to assume divergent government approval
patterns both between and within regions and groups.
Generally, we agree with the well-known phrase the changes in the economy
are experienced locally rather than nationally. However, the relationship be-
tween the national and the local economies in explaining the popularity ratings
should not be seen as rival, but more as complementary to each other. The
local economy may go to diﬀerent direction as the national economy. The same
applies of course to ones personal economy with respect to the national and the
local economies. Yet, they do not exclude each other in outlining the countrys
economic development. Overall, the regional economic divergence has gained
attention in the economics research and, thus, the importance of connecting
a person to her/his locality has been notiÞed also in the popularity research
(see e.g. Marsh, 2002). It is admitted that controlling on the decision-making
context is essential as the contexts (be it regions or other kind of groups) dif-
fer from each other with respect to the dependent and independent variables.
Marsh (2002) also reminds of the general, but in many cases misleading, as-
sumption of the universal equivalence of phenomena, events and issues2. In
other words, we often hold comparable things that are it only on the surface.
Regions diﬀer from each other due to the disparities in the production struc-
ture, which creates diﬀerent kind of skill structures and skill distributions to
the regions. Diﬀerences in the production structure lead to diﬀerences in the
economic development, not only in a crisis but in normal times, too. The share
2He refers to a situation of being a small farmers in the western Ireland and being it near
the capital.
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of industrial manufacturing and agriculture in the employment, the unemploy-
ment rate and the regional gross domestic product are structural factors that
emphasize regional distinctiveness and are further reßected for example in the
regional political atmosphere. Furthermore, the possible restructuring of the
production leads to concentration of diﬀerent sectorial employment in diﬀerent
areas. This again causes changes in the local socio-economic composition, and
selective migration from a region to another still strengthens this eﬀect. (Curtice
and Steed, 1982)
In the Finnish case, the usual statistical measures conÞrm the variation
between regions. The length of the depression varied from region to region from
4 to 8-9 years (Kuntaliitto, 1999). As Table 1 shows, the highest unemployment
rates in the crisis years occurred in Eastern and Northern Finland. Those rates
also remained high as there was a regional mismatch in the job creation process:
employment opportunities increased in the Western and Southern Finland, but
unemployment increasingly concentrated in the Eastern and Northern Finland
(Koskela and Uusitalo, 2002). Overall, convergence in the regional employment
rates began in 1997 (Kangasharju et al., 2002). Another general measure for
the diﬀerences is incomes. When the country is divided into four areas, it seems
that from 1990 to 1998, the relative income diﬀerences between regions did not
grow. Taxation and transfers had a role in smoothing the diﬀerences. Within
the regions the picture is, though, diﬀerent. For each area separately calculated
Gini-coeﬃcients, both on the basis of disposable and gross incomes per capita,
show that in the 1990s the income inequality within the regions started to
increase. It began Þrst in the capital area and then spread throughout the
country. Nevertheless, this divergence did not occur in the factor incomes.
(Kangasharju et al., 2002)
Obviously, there are many objective economic indicators to outline the re-
gional economic distinctiveness. We have chosen the local unemployment. There
are several reasons that favour the use of the local unemployment as the local
economic indicator. First, there is a lot of variation in the local unemployment
rates (see Table 1.). Nevertheless, the diverging unemployment development
is not fully mediated to disposable income diﬀerences since the social transfers
had high coverage percentage (Kangasharju et al., 2002). Second, the impact of
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unemployment is not restricted to the person unemployed but aﬀects the whole
family. Persons living in high unemployment regions have more likely either
themselves or via a family member or a friend been touched by unemployment.
Besides, the respondents living in low unemployment regions are likely to have
diﬀerent perceptions of the aggregate economy than those living in high un-
employment regions. Third, the local unemployment receives attention in the
local media. Hence, it is a well-known economic indicator. Finnish studies show
that, especially from 1991 to 1993, the medias interest in the economy increased.
From 1988 to 1997, approximately 20% of all the news stories were about the
economy. In other words, along the unemployment rose also the number of arti-
cles on the topic. SpeciÞcally, in the local newspapers the local economic aspect
was emphasized in the crisis period. (Aslama et al., 2002) These Þndings give
a reason to assume that citizens were aware of their regions economy as well as
the whole countrys economy.
Table 1. Average unemployment in diﬀerent regions and in diﬀerent periods cal-
culated as weighted averages of municipal monthly rates.
Region 1992-95 1996-01
Southern Uusimaa 14.8 10.9
Vars.-Suomi 16.8 13.1
Häme 19.6 16.3
Kymi 18.8 17.1
Eastern Etelä-Savo 19.8 18.3
Pohj.-Savo 19.3 17.8
P-Karjala 20.9 21.2
Kainuu 23.0 22.5
Western K-Suomi 21.0 18.4
Pirkanmaa 19.5 16.0
Satakunta 19.9 17.4
E-Pohjanmaa 17.1 13.9
Pohjanmaa 10.7 12.6
Northern P-Pohjanmaa 20.1 16.8
Lappi 23.7 22.7
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Besides the economic development, there are other factors that can pro-
mote the regional distinctiveness. A concept related to the non-economic re-
gional inßuence is so-called neighborhood eﬀect (Miller, 1977), which includes
the strengthening of the traditional party aﬃliations in the region. The voters
whose class-based vote choice would be something else voted for the party, which
had the strongest position in that region. In addition, in the diﬀerent local envi-
ronments political events are understood and interpreted diﬀerently. The local
media has a role in building the local atmosphere which aﬀects attitudes and
behavior (Johnston and Pattie, 1998).
In Table 2, we list the government approval rates in the Finnish provinces.
The Þrst period covers the years of the right government, the second the years
of the wider coalition government. The approval rates follow closely the re-
sults of the parliamentary elections. The Centre Party was the largest party in
all the three parliamentary elections held in the 1990s in Pohjois-Savo, Vaasa
(Pohjanmaa), Oulu (includes Kainuu), Lappi; in addition, in 1991 and 1999
in Etelä-Savo and Keski-Suomi. The Social Democratic Party was the biggest
party in all three elections in Satakunta, Häme and Kymi. Helsinki and Uusimaa
are the strongholds of the National Coalition Party. Concrete issues in which
the regions diverge are for example preferences on industry speciÞc subsidies
and the attitudes towards the EU.
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Table 2. Regional government approval rates.
Region 1992-2001 1992-95 1995-01
National 40.1 19.1 51.9
Southern Uusimaa 46.6 17.2 63.7
Vars.-Suomi 40.3 16.5 54.8
Häme 41 20.4 52.8
Kymi 38.3 15.9 52.0
Eastern Etelä-Savo 37.7 18.9 48.5
Pohj.-Savo 39.9 19.7 49.9
P-Karjala 34.5 15.8 49.0
Kainuu 27.1 10.8 31.8
Western K-Suomi 39.9 32.2 43.4
Pirkanmaa 40.0 16.1 53.3
Satakunta 35.6 15.9 49.8
E-Pohjanmaa 34.1 23.9 39.9
Pohjanmaa 45.6 31.5 51.0
Northern P-Pohjanmaa 37.3 23.2 44.9
Lappi 33.6 20.6 40.7
2.2 Some Other Aspects of the Economic Development3
The recession of the 1990s does not Þt into the frames of a usual economic
downturn. Typical of the depression was the huge increase in the unemployment
rate, from 3 % in 1990 to almost 20% in 1994. Annual average growth rate from
1991 to 1993 was -3.8%. Even if the depression left almost everyone worse oﬀ
compared to the prior situation, or as Lehtinen (1998) puts it everyone lost,
not all the groups beneÞtted equally of the subsequent economic growth and
the increase of the employment opportunities.
Unemployment
The nature of the unemployment changes in the observation period. In the
beginning, it is cyclical unemployment due to the sudden and unforeseeable
changes in the economy. Then it becomes structural unemployment as a more
3Based on Vartia and Kiander 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
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profound change takes place in the society. In the crisis, jobs were lost mostly
in the construction and manufacturing industries, in the recovery period new
jobs were created mainly in the service sector. This mismatch between the un-
employed and the new jobs gave rise to the structural unemployment. (Koskela
and Uusitalo, 2003) The relative position of the unemployed worsened as their
average disposable incomes declined in the 1990s. In the latter half of the
1990s the unemployed were more often long-term unemployed who receive the
means-tested minimum unemployment security beneÞt. Therefore since 1994
the unemployed have lived more often in poverty (less than 50% national aver-
age income) than in 1994. (Riihelä et al., 2002)
Groupwise investigation of the unemployment development tells the follow-
ing. Womens unemployment never reached the level of mens unemployment
(both peaked in 1994). But there was also a diﬀerence in the declining process:
mens unemployment declined faster than womens unemployment and in 1997
mens unemployment was lower than womens. Unemployment rose in every
educational group but in the crisis the gap widened between the highest and
the lowest educational group. Those having polytechnic degrees experienced the
fastest increase in employment opportunities after the crisis.
Decline of employment hurt most the youngest (18-25 years) age group.
When the unemployment is disaggregated by age, then the elderly (45-59 years)
have overrepresentation. Elderly with low education have the weakest job mar-
ket position but unemployment has remained high among the lowest educated
young people, too. In the end of 1990s, the lowest educational group made up
the largest group when unemployment is disaggregated by education.
Incomes
In the crisis, the highest educated experienced the smallest decline in income.
In the Þrst recovery years the wages of all educational groups grew similarly,
only the lowest educational group had a little lower wage growth. Since 1996
the highest educated have had also the highest wage increases. Depression inßu-
enced most the wage incomes of the age group under 40 (in 2001). The average
wage incomes in the group under 40 in the end of 1990s was lower than the
same age groups in the beginning of 1990s. Only the highest educated under
40 have experienced average income increases. Pensioners relative position in
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income distribution even improved (Lehtinen, 1998).
Income distribution
In the depression period from 1990 to 1993 the increase in the unemployment
caused signiÞcant changes in the relative distribution of the factor incomes but
these changes were not transmitted to the relative distribution of the disposable
incomes. Contribution of the income transfers to the tranquility of the dispos-
able incomes was larger than that of the progressive income taxation. (Lehtinen
1998)
Income inequality between individuals has increased in the 1990s. First,
the reason was piling unemployment in the crisis years (1990-94), afterwards
the capital incomes, as their share in earnings has increased. In addition, in-
come redistribution has declined in the 1990s. Gini coeﬃcients calculated sepa-
rately for diﬀerent socio-economic groups (farmers, entrepreneurs, white collars,
blue collars, workers, unemployed, pensioners) show increased inequality within
these groups. From 1994 to 1998 the biggest increases in inequality occurred in
the households headed by pensioners, farmers, entrepreneurs and white collars.
(Riihelä et al., 2002)
According to Ritakallio (2002) poverty is increasingly likely to be connected
to ones socio-economic position (labour market status, education, social po-
sition). In addition, social assistance and over-indebtness are linked to low
education and blue-collar status. Further, from 1995 to 2000 the relative posi-
tion of single-parent families worsened but feminization of the poverty did not
occur in Finland.
Values
Divergence occurred also at the mental level. The decline of conformity of
the Finnish values strengthened in the crisis, solidarity towards the less-well-oﬀ
decreased among the middle-aged, educated and Southerners. Furthermore, the
rural-urban divide was born. (Aslama et al., 2002) On one hand, the well-oﬀ
people were not sympathetic, on the other hand, the less-well-oﬀ did not them-
selves unite and bring up their cause and constitute a political force (Häkkinen
and Peltola, 2002).
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3 Data and Specification of the Popularity Func-
tion
3.1 Data
Our data is gathered by Gallup Finland for Kaleva-newspaper. The data consist
of 15 biannual random samples of the Finnish voting age (over 18 years) popu-
lation. The Þrst poll employed is Spring 1992 and the last is Autumn 20014. On
average there are 950 respondents in each poll (ranging from 914 to 1428). There
are on average 300 respondents per survey excluded from the data due to no
answer to the government approval question, that leaves us with approximately
650 respondents in each survey. The exclusion may slightly aﬀect the repre-
sentativeness of the sample since those excluded may have diﬀerent response
patterns also otherwise. The average respondent is 46 years old and 48% of the
respondents are women. Diﬀerent respondents have been interviewed every time
and, hence, the distributions of variables are likely to diﬀer from poll to poll.
Consequently, the observations are independent, but not identically distributed.
This type of data is called pooled cross sections over time (Wooldridge, 2002).
The inoccurrence of repeated individual observations distinguishes it from panel
data.
The questionnaire is designed by Gallup Finland, the survey questions diﬀer
from time to time as well as the answer categories. In telephone interviews the
respondents have been asked of their government, prime ministerial and pres-
idential approval. Further, their vote intention and voting in the last election
held (either parliamentary or local) is asked. Of the socio-economic and demo-
graphic variables the following are recorded: age, sex, education, income class,
occupational class, region of residence (municipal) and labor market status. The
exact coding of the variables is reported in Appendix 1. Since the original survey
data includes the municipal of residence of each respondent, it provides an easy
way to append the data set with the local unemployment rates. We add the
NUTS3-level unemployment rates. As geographical units, the NUTS3-regions
are very close to the well-known provinces.
As the surveys cover several years and three electoral periods, it is meaningful
4Unfortunately, not all the surveys of the period were available from Gallup Finland.
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to divide the data into two subperiods according to the government coalition
(Table 3). The Þrst period covers the years from 1992 to 1995, and the latter
from 1996 to 2001. This division is practical also from the point of view of
our hypotheses. From 1992 to 2001, Finland was governed by three multiparty
coalitions. Party combination in the last two coalitions was essentially the same.
The Þrst coalition was a pure right government but after that the country was
governed by a combination of parties from the left to the right. (See Table 4)
The latter coalition is usually called the rainbow coalition.
Table 3. Periods and observations.
Period Polls Month/year Average obs. Total N
1992-95 5 4/92, 9/92, 690 3454
4/93, 12/93, 5/94
1996-01 10 4/96, 4/97, 11/97, 610 6100
11/98, 5/99, 11/99,
4/00, 11/00, 3/01, 11/01
Sum 15 637 9554
As Table 4 shows, there is a huge increase in the government average pop-
ularity from the Þrst period to the latter. This diﬀerence can not be explained
just by the increased number of parties in the coalition. The Þrst period coin-
cides quite exactly with the deepest phase of the depression and the Þrst signs
of recovery. The governments popularity level during the crisis signals a widely
felt discontent with the governments policies and actions. In Table 5, the gov-
ernment popularities are listed by socio-economic groups (See Appendix 1 for
the abbreviations and classiÞcations).
Table 4. Government popularity (%) and incumbents in diﬀerent periods.
Mean Std Max Min Incumbent parties
1992-95 19.1 39.3 23.2 15.3 NC, CENT, SSPP, CD
1996-01 51.9 49.9 65.8 31.9 NC, SDP, LA, GL, SSPP
Abbreviations: NC (National Coalition), SSPP (Swedish Speaking Peoples Party), SDP
(Social Democratic Party), CENT (Finnish Centre Party), LA (Left Alliance), GL (Green
League), CD (Christian Democratic Party).
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Table 5. Government popularity by groups and time periods.
1992-2001a 1992-95 1996-01
All 40.1 19.1 51.9
Gender Men 40.6 18.5 52.7
Women 39.6 19.8 51.2
Age 18-25 40.4 20.0 63.1
25-34 34.9 14.9 51.4
35-49 35.7 16.2 47.3
50-64 44.0 19.5 53.4
64+ 47.7 32.4 53.6
Education No-training 26.5 15.6 33.3
Vocational 41.9 20.9 53.7
Polytechnic 37.8 17.5 52.3
Academic 39.8 17.7 48.7
Income Below mid 43.4 20.1 53.4
Mid 36.9 19.4 48.8
Above mid 39.9 15.9 49.1
Socio Farmer 35.1 46.8 29.9
Entrepreneur 41.6 19.6 51.2
White collar 43.4 19.6 56.3
Blue collar 33.1 10.4 49.6
Labour Employed 51.6
market Unemployed 44.4
Voted for SDP 46.8 8.1 80.3
CENT 38.1 64 28.9
NC 62.1 36.3 71.7
LA 23.1 5.3 42.7
aThe whole period average popularities within groups depends on the size of each group
in each period. The sizes may vary somewhat, due to the diﬀerent number of surveys available
in each period.
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3.2 Specification of the Popularity Function
Nature and composition of the data determines the estimation method. In our
data, the dependent variable is dichotomous; the respondent either approves the
government (=1) or does it not (=0). The explanatory variables include both
binary and continuous variables. There are several possibilities for estimating
a binary response model. The repeated cross-sectional data leads to a static
model. All the static methods for pure cross-sectional data are applicable to
our data, too.
The essential diﬀerence in modeling panel data and repeated cross-sectional
data is that in the repeated cross-sectional data controlling for the individual-
speciÞc eﬀects is not possible, the only controllable eﬀects are time-speciÞc.
Thus, one issue in picking the estimation method is how to correctly take the
time-speciÞc eﬀects into account. There are two ways available for separating
the time-speciÞc eﬀects, either use a Þxed-eﬀects model or to highlight the time-
speciÞc eﬀects by dummies in a random eﬀects model. The dummy approach can
be applied to any random eﬀects logit or probit model. According to several
textbook sources the logit and probit estimations would yield similar results
(Hsiao, 2003, Wooldridge, 2002). Considering our data and the aim of the
study, it is easy to make a decision between the methods.
Our data consists of repeated random samples of voting age population, and
every data combination applied in our study includes a few thousand observa-
tions. The aim in the polls is with the use of representative samples of the whole
population to uncover the underlying public opinion on the matter at question.
Hence, the method with which one studies the eﬀects diﬀerent individual-level
characteristics have on ones opinion has to obey the original purpose of the
polls. The Þxed-eﬀects method yields inferences conditional on the eﬀects in
the sample, whereas the basic idea in the random eﬀects method is to make in-
ferences with respect to the underlying population characteristics. The random
eﬀects method treats the values of the explanatory variables as representative
draws from a larger population of values and thus yields inferences conditional
on the underlying population. (Hsiao, 2003). Therefore, our starting point is
the maximum likelihood random eﬀects probit with the time-speciÞc dummies.
The estimated model is as follows,
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(1) G∗i,t = βo + λt + β
0
1Wi,t + β2Ij,t + εi,t,
where Gi,t = 1, if G∗i,t > 0; Gi,t = 0 otherwise.
G∗i,t is a latent continuous random variable and Gi,t is its observed binary
counterpart which equals unity if a person approves of the government and
zero otherwise. βo is a common-to-all intercept, λt includes the time speciÞc
dummies (assumed random and estimated along with the other explanatory
variables), vector Wi,t includes the individual-level characteristics (like educa-
tion, sex, etc.) and Ij,t is the regional indicator, in this case either the local
unemployment or the provincial dummy indicating respondents home province.
The error term, εi,t, is assumed identically independently distributed.
In adding the variables to the equation, attention is paid on the possible
identiÞcation problems that weaken the estimated inßuence. For example, we
can not include the socio-occupational group pensioners and the age group above
65 years into the same regression as there is strong correlation between these
two variables. We face similar a situation with the local unemployment rate and
the respondents region of residence, since both of them are coded for the same
geographical units and it would be diﬃcult to identify the separate inßuences of
each of the variables.5 Thus, we estimate two separate popularity functions, one
with the local unemployment rate and the other with the respondents region of
residence. For both popularity models our strategy is to hold as many factors
Þxed as possible. In other words, to include as many background variables in the
regression as available. Our aim is to Þnd out how various background variables
aﬀect persons approval behavior, not to Þnd the best Þtting model.
There are three practices to explore whether the poll respondents with diﬀer-
ent socio-economic backgrounds approve of the government diﬀerently. Firstly,
to use these characteristics as explanators. This will tell which groups stand
out in the whole data. The signiÞcance of each variable for the model as a
whole is tested with LR-test. Secondly, to group the whole data according to a
certain feature and estimate the popularity function in the subset of the data
5We estimated a model having both the local unemployment and the region of residence
in a regression. In this experiment the signiÞcancies of the region of residence dummies
disappeared, their values and the signs of the coeﬃcients changed. We consider this as a
signal of identiÞcation problem.
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(e.g. men/women). This way we may reach groups that are not recognizable
in the whole data but come up within a smaller group. The second approach
means running almost one hundred separate regressions. Not all the groupwise
estimations are expected to yield meaningful results, since each socio-economic
and demographic group consists of people with varied life-styles and values who
are not likely to share common interests in policy issues. In the groupwise esti-
mations only the local unemployment rate is included6. We have included in the
Appendix 2 the results of the estimations by gender, the rest of the groupwise
results are available from the author upon request. Thirdly, to apply interaction
variables when estimating on the whole data to Þnd out whether the interacted
groups stand out in the whole data. Comparing and combining the results of
the Þrst two methods, we may get some idea which interacted variables would
stand out in the whole data. There is one diﬃculty, though. According to Ai
and Norton (2003) applying interaction in a probit is somewhat problematic,
since the estimated marginal eﬀects can be misleading what comes to size, sign
and signiÞcance7. Nevertheless, that does not deter us testing the signiÞcance
of the interactions with LR-test.
6 Inclusion of respondents region of residence would in some groupwise estimations decrease
the degrees of freedom too much.
7Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) introduces a command calculating the correct interaction
eﬀects in probit models in Stata. Its weakness is that it allows just one interaction variable
into the model at a time.
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4 Estimation Results
An important issue in the probit models is the interpretation of both discrete
and continuous explanatory variables. Following the common practise, we re-
port the marginal eﬀects with respective signiÞcance levels in the text, while the
actual parameter estimates and their standard errors are printed in Appendix
2. For a categorical variable, the marginal eﬀect is the change from zero to one,
holding all other variables Þxed. For a continuous variable, it is the inÞnitesimal
change evaluated at its mean level. Nevertheless, the marginal eﬀect is exact
only in the proximity of the mean, for other values it is just an approximation.
In order to get the exact marginal eﬀect for wider intervals, one has to calcu-
late Þrst the likelihood at each end of the interval and then subtract them as
follows P (y|u = high) − P (y|u = low). This subtraction yields an answer to
the question how much does the approval likelihood change when we move from
a low unemployment region to a high unemployment region, holding all other
variables Þxed. Reference categories for each variable are listed below the re-
spective table. Although the coeﬃcient signs and signiÞcances are more relevant
in judging the Þt of the model, we also report the values of the likelihood func-
tion, pseudo-R2 and the percentage correctly predicted. The statistical package
used in the estimation is Stata 8.0.
In the following, we report the results variable by variable Þrst commenting
the periodwise results, then making some remarks on the subgroup results.
In interpreting and discussing the results we apply the evidence of the 1990s
depression, the general knowledge of the Finnish political behavior and the
results in international studies in our Þeld.
In order to Þnd out whether real and signiÞcant diﬀerences exist between the
two government types, we estimated the model on the entire data and separated
the diﬀerent government types with dummies. The followed LR-test showed
highly signiÞcant diﬀerences between the government types. In addition, we
applied LR-test to see the signiÞcance of each variable in the model. The re-
sults are listed in the Appendix 2 in Table 4. Thus, we move on to estimate the
model for the two government types separately. The estimated coeﬃcients in
the model with the region of residence and in the model with the local unem-
ployment are essentially the same. Hence, we report only the ones including the
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region of residence. Table 6 gives the complete result for the two government
types. Overall, it seems that in the Þrst period the local unemployment, po-
litical orientation, demographic variables, own economic situation and region of
residence are not very helpful in predicting the government approval. Whereas
exactly the same variables yield quite high a percentage of correctly predicted
responses in the latter period. Reasons for this Þnding may lie in the very low
government popularity in the Þrst period (on average 19%), the extraordinary
economic development and the ongoing fast and thorough transformation of the
society. These factors are likely to shrink the explanatory power of the generally
applied variables.
Unemployment
The responsibility hypothesis leads us to assume wider discontent with the
government among the respondents in the regions of high unemployment. The
marginal eﬀect of the local unemployment in the Þrst period is 0.007 and in the
latter period -0.01. In the Þrst period it is not signiÞcant, but in the second
period it is signiÞcant at 1% risk level. We have calculated the response probabil-
ities for low and high unemployment regions separately, just as described above.
The subsequent subtraction gives us some very interesting results. In the Þrst
period, the respondents living in Lappi (the highest local unemployment 25.6%)
are approximately 11 percentage points more likely to support the government
than the respondents in Uusimaa (the lowest local unemployment 9.9%). In the
latter period, the respondents in Lappi (the local unemployment still 25.6%) are
approximately 23 percentage points less likely to support the government than
are the respondents in Uusimaa (the local unemployment 7.3%). In other words,
in case of the rightist government the respondents likelihood to support the gov-
ernment is positively aﬀected by the high local unemployment: the higher the
local unemployment, the higher the likelihood of supporting the government.
To illustrate the diﬀerences between the government types we calculated the
predicted government approval likelihood for each local unemployment percent-
age, i.e. P(y|u=11.9), P(y|u=12.9), etc. The resulting points are depicted in the
Figure 1 where the predicted government approval likelihood is plotted against
the local unemployment. Reading the Þgure tells for example that in a region
of 12% unemployment a persons likelihood to approve of the government in the
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Þrst government period is approximately 32%, whereas in the second period it
is 45%.
This Þnding is in stark contrast with the responsibility hypothesis, the re-
sults in the international studies (Pattie and Johnston, 1995a, 1995b, Johston et
al., 2000) and the Finnish studies involving the aggregate-level variables, where
it was found that especially in its government period the Centre Party and the
National Coalition were punished for the unemployment (Asikainen, 2002). It
seems that entering the regional level completely changes the picture. How-
ever, an apparent explanation for these opposite results lies to a great extent in
the regional distinctiveness of the popularity of the Centre Party. The Centre
Party has a historically dominant position in sparsely populated rural areas in
Northern and Eastern Finland, where the unemployment rates are still high. In
those areas the Centre Party has long been a catch-all party (Arter, 1999) and
it seems that the poor local economic development wont change that.
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Figure 1. Local unemployment plotted against the predicted government approval.
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Table 6. Estimation results (marginal eﬀects) on the government popularity func-
tion for diﬀerent periods with regional dummies.
1995-95 1995-01
Poll Au92 -0.06
Au93 -0.04
Sp93 -0.05
Sp94 -0.02
Sp97 0.08*
Au97 0.07*
Au98 0.1**
Sp99 0.01
Au99 0.06*
Sp00 0.07*
Sp01 0.01
Au01 0.09**
Govt1
Govt2
Govt3 0.29**
Regiona Vars.Suomi (S) -0.05 -0.06*
Satakunta (W) -0.03 -0.08*
Häme (S) 0.07 -0.08**
Pirkanmaa (W) -0.007 -0.08**
Kymi (S) -0.001 -0.11**
Etelä-Savo (E) 0.07 -0.09*
Pohj.-Savo (E) 0.05 -0.07*
P-Karjala (E) -0.03 -0.13**
K-Suomi (W) 0.19** -0.14**
E-Pohjanmaa (W) -0.07 -0.14**
Pohjanmaa (W) 0.15* -0.09**
P-Pohjanmaa (N) -0.01 -0.1**
Kainuu (E) -0.1 -0.24**
Lappi (N) 0.06 -0.14**
Genderb Woman 0.003 0.01
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Table 6 continues. Results for diﬀerent periods with regional dummies.
1992-95 1995-01
Agec 18-24 -0.06 0.17**
25-34 -0.12** 0.02
35-49 -0.12** -0.02
50-64 -0.1** 0.02
Educationd Notraining -0.07 -0.18*
Vocational -0.07 -0.04
Polytechnic -0.06 -0.06*
Academic -0.09* -0.06*
Socioe Farmer 0.11 -0.15**
Entrepreneur -0.06 0.001
White-collar -0.04 0.02
Blue-collar -0.12** -0.02
Pensioner 0.01 0.01
Incomef Below-mid 0.002 -0.06**
Mid 0.01 -0.06**
Above-mid -0.007 -0.07**
Voted forg SDP -0.1** 0.36**
NC 0.3** 0.25**
CENT 0.5** -0.15**
LEFT -0.15** -0.02
GREEN -0.11** 0.03
Labour Employed -0.01
marketh Unemployed -0.03
N 3453 6100
pseudo R2 0.23 0.16
log likelihood -1296.9 -3530.1
% corr. pred 12.4 53.6
Notes: Baseline categories for a Uusimaa, b men, c 65+, d other, e student, other, f
dont tell, g other parties, h outside labour force and others.. (S) Southern, (E) Eastern, (W)
Western, (N) Northern. *(**) = statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
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On average the unemployment rate in the Centre Partys core areas does not
essentially change from the Þrst period to the latter. Nonetheless, the attitude
towards the local unemployment changes as the government coalition changes.
In the Þrst period - interpretation according to the responsibility hypothesis
- it is not the governments fault, but in the latter period the government is
punished for the high local unemployment. Besides, in its opposition period the
Centre Party has strongly forwarded the message of governments inaction in
smoothing the regional disparities. Obviously, the message has hit home at the
target audiences, namely, Northern and Eastern provinces.
Another unexpected feature is that being unemployed oneself does not have
a signiÞcant inßuence on the approval likelihood. Let us bear in mind that the
respondents labour market status is recorded only in the surveys of the two last
electoral periods. After the mid-1990s the nature of the unemployment began
to transform into structural unemployment, which includes persons with dated
skills and education. With this data it is impossible to separate the long-term
unemployment from seasonal and cyclical unemployment. It is very likely that
the reason for being unemployed as well as age, education etc. aﬀects ones ex-
pectations of the future and thus makes this group quite heterogenous. To get a
more educated opinion on the topic whether the unemployed approve of the gov-
ernment diﬀerently, we estimate the model in the group of unemployed. There
are altogether 396 unemployed respondents in the surveys. The results show
two dissimilarities compared to the results in Table 6. First, the unemployed
entrepreneurs increased likelihood to disapprove of the government. Compared
to the other groups of unemployed, the entrepreneurs have low unemployment
beneÞts and that may drive their criticism toward the government. Second, the
unemployed National Coalitions voters are more likely to approve of the gov-
ernment than for example the Social Democratic Partys (unemployed) voters.
The unemployed National Coalition voters do not blame the government for
their unemployment, as they are even more likely to approve of the government
than the other National Coalitions voters.8
8 92% of the unemployed National Coalition voters approve of the government, whereas
67% of the unemployed Social Democratic Partys voters do so.
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Region
We included the home province dummy for each respondent as we wished
to capture the non-economic eﬀects that living in a certain province may have.
Since it is not possible to include all the regions in one regression at the same
time, we dropped Uusimaa. It seems to be a natural comparison group because
Uusimaa features as the forerunner in the economic development among the
provinces. Correlation makes it impossible to add local unemployment or any
kinds of interactions with it to the same regression with the province dummies.
Thus, it is diﬃcult to exclude the possible inßuence of the economy.
In the Þrst subperiod, we Þnd expectably the dominant position of the Centre
Party in certain regions. The respondents living Keski-Suomi and Pohjanmaa
were 19% and 15% more likely to approve of the government than the respon-
dents in Uusimaa. For the other regions the coeﬃcients were not signiÞcant.
In the latter period, the diﬀerences between regions are more pronounced. It is
diﬃcult to say whether it is caused by the change of the government coalition,
or by the change of times generally. The highest likelihood of not approving of
the government is in Kainuu, second comes Lappi, third Etelä-Pohjanmaa and
fourth Keski-Suomi. The result is not surprising as the Þrst two are Northern
regions of low incomes, high unemployment and high vote share of the Centre
Party. In addition, the latter two regions belong to the Centre Partys core
areas and, thus, it is natural to see the low government approval there.
Political orientation
We assume that the party the respondent voted for in the last election reßects
his/her political orientation. Therefore, we expect that the incumbency of ones
latest electoral choice increases ones likelihood to approve of the government.
That is also the case. The coalition change is visible as those who voted for
the Social Democratic Party become more likely to approve of the government
in the latter period and, respectively, the voters of the Centre Party become
less likely to approve of it. These results indicate that the Centre Party voters
are more inclined than the other parties voters to approve or disapprove of
the government according to their favorite partys parliamentary position. The
voters of the Left Alliance are less likely to approve of the right government, but
in the second period the partys incumbency leaves them indiﬀerent towards the
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government.
The National Coalitions incumbency stretches over the entire research pe-
riod, and its voters are from 25 to 30% more likely to approve of the both
government types than others. Maybe due to its long incumbency, the voters
of the National Coalitions main coalition partner are more likely to approve of
the government. The stronger adherence may be due to the prime ministers
position held by the Centre Party and later by the Social Democratic Party.
Often the government is personiÞed in good and in bad to the prime minister.
Estimations among the party supporters show that in the Þrst period the
blue-collar Centre Party voters are 22 % less likely to approve of the govern-
ment, this Þnding is naturally explained by the groups aversion of the National
Coalition. In addition, the Centre Party voters with less than 49 years of age
or with high incomes are from 22 to 28 % less likely to approve of the right
government. Maybe these groups include the so-called swing voters who just
happened to vote for the Centre Party in the latest election but do not belong
to its core supporters.
In addition, here we document clear evidence that not all the incumbent
party voters approve of the government. Thus, the summing up of the party
popularities to get the government coalition popularity leads to biased numbers.
If this approach is applied in the aggregate popularity function research, the
results will be undoubtly unreliable.
Socio-occupational group
Finland has a history of strongly class-based party support. Growing class
dealignment on the voters side and the parties transformation from class-based
parties to catch-all parties have obviously weakened the ties. In addition, new
parties have emerged to catch the voters. Yet, it still is common knowledge that
the Social Democratic Party basis its support on blue-collar workers, the Centre
Party on farmers and rural residents, and the National Coalition on white-collar
workers.
Our results indicate that the farmers and the blue-collar workers have class-
based approval behavior. The blue-collar workers are more likely than any other
group to disapprove of the right government, whereas the farmers are several
times more likely to disapprove of the rainbow coalition which excludes the
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Centre Party. These results suggest that the class-based support comes actually
up as non-support. This inverse inßuence may reßect the dealignment process
as these voter groups - the farmers and the blue-collars - know what they oppose
(the SDP led government, the rightist government) but are no longer strongly
for their traditional party.
Besides, among the farmers the discontent felt with the government in the
latter period may be mixed with their disapproval of the European Union. From
1995 to 1999, the issues related to the EU received a lot of attention in the media
(Aslama et al., 2002) and it was a topic heavily promoted by the government.
Gender
There is international evidence showing emergence of a gender gap in vot-
ing and party support. Hence, we expect to discover some gender diﬀerences
also here. We Þnd that gender does not make one more likely to approve or
disapprove of the government and this holds for both government types. Nev-
ertheless, diﬀerences arise when we estimate the same model for both genders
separately. It is the education that makes the diﬀerence. One diﬀerence comes
from the eﬀect of having no training. In the latter period, it decreases 21%
mens likelihood to approve of the government whereas it does not signiÞcantly
change womens approval likelihood. Here we probably have the phenomena
which the being unemployed oneself -variable did not catch. The men without
any training have a weak job market position, thus, facing higher risks of eco-
nomic misfortunes. In addition, this group of men faces social risks of becoming
estranged from the society. In the latter half of the 1990s social assistance
and over-indebtness is linked to low education (Ritakallio, 2002) Thus, this is
a less-well-oﬀ group, or at the risk of becoming one, which might oppose the
governments reductive policies directed at the welfare services and transfers.
At least as fascinating a Þnding concerns the highly educated women. In
the Þrst government period, we Þnd that the academic women are 14% less
likely to approve of the government, in the latter period, the percentage drops
to 10%. In the latter period, the discontent has spread as the women having
polytechnic degrees are 8% more likely to disapprove of the government. All in
all, the academic women are more unsatisÞed with the outcomes delivered by
any government type.
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Obviously, critical thinking increases along with education and the target of
the criticism can justiÞably be the government as well as any other instance.
Strikingly, the same increase in the criticism towards the government does not
happen to men. In the following, we try to reason an explanation. Firstly,
international evidence shows that women increasingly tend to favour the left
parties. This is assumed to be connected to the increasing number of divorces
which lead to the increasing number of single-parent households, where the
parent most likely is the mother. The left parties favour redistributive policies,
part of which are targeted to children and low-income households. (Edlund
and Pande, 2002, Edlund et al., 2003) Secondly, Finnish studies show that in
the 1990s the redistributional eﬀorts by the government have declined (Riihelä
et al., 2001), in the recovery from the depression the government put heavier
weight on cutbacks in the public expenditures than on the increases of taxes
(Kautto, 2001), not only the level of the social beneÞts has lowered but also
eligibility to the transfers has become more diﬃcult in the 1990s (Lehtonen
et al., 2002) and the single-parent households relative position has worsened
(Ritakallio, 2002). Connecting the Þrst and the second point, we suggest that
the academic (and polytechnic) women might oppose the governments policies
that lead to decline in the welfare services. These women may see the transfers
and services as insurances against being less-well-oﬀ themselves if they end up as
single-parents. Our reasoning needs clariÞcation on the part that why it is just
the highly educated women who are more likely to disapprove of the government
since also the less educated women must concretely face the problems of the
single parenthood. The highly educated women are likely to be married to the
highly educated and high earning men. The gender wage gap is the wider the
higher is the educational level. Thus, in case of a divorce the highly educated
women lose more in relative terms than their less educated sisters who are likely
to be married to men with lower education and lower incomes. The public
transfers replace a lower percentage of the lost incomes in high income families
and further declines in the transfers may increase the highly educated womens
discontent with the policymaking.
Another explanation for the Þnding might come from somewhat diﬀerent
104
direction9. The discontent felt by the highly educated women might be directed
at the societywide attitudes and often invisible structures that end up limiting
their possibilities to make use of their skills and capacities at full. As young
(18-25 years), they do not realize this but rather have an optimistic view on
policymaking supporting the government10. With age and education the disil-
lusionment is associated with increasing criticism towards the decisionmaking
bodies.
In addition, we interacted Þrst sex and education and then sex and age. We
included the interaction variables in the regression on the whole data. Unfortu-
nately, the LR-test found the inßuence of all the interactions not signiÞcant11 .
Age
The oldest age group (over 65 years) had to be excluded due to strong corre-
lation with the socio-occupational group pensioners. Each age group consists
of people with varied life-styles and values. Actually, it would be surprising to
Þnd coherent opinions towards the government within age groups. But there
are those, as we will learn. In the Þrst periods results we notice that young
people (18-25 years) have more positive views of the government compared to
other age groups. In the latter period, the young are several times more likely
to approve of the government than others are. More precisely, the results show
that belonging to the youngest age group increases ones likelihood of approv-
ing of the government by 17 %. An interesting Þnding is also that in the latter
period the women in the youngest age group are more likely to approve of the
government than the men in the respective age group. This result might reßect
the overall optimism of the young. This view is supported by the survey results
reported by Aslama et al. (2002). They conclude that young people regarded
the crisis as some sort of survival training, ie. did not see it as an end of an
era or in very negative terms. Further, estimation within the age groups tells
that socialization to ones socio-occupational group begins early since already
in the youngest age group the blue-collar workers are 16 % less likely to approve
of the rightist government than others.
9The following reasoning has arisen in discussions with Professor Mikkola.
10 See the results for Age.
11The method presented in Ai-Norton-Wang (2004) yielded the same result. The results
are available from the author upon request.
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Education
We expect the educational diﬀerences to be seen in the opinions of those
having no-training. As reported above, the overall position of the no-trained
has weakened in the 1990s. Our results show that in the Þrst period, the
only educational group signiÞcantly more likely than others to disapprove of
the government is the academic. In the latter period, the no-training group is
18% more likely to disapprove of the government. In addition, having either
academic or polytechnic education increases ones likelihood to disapprove but
not as largely. The diﬀerences in the magnitudes of the marginal eﬀects between
educational groups are large, and they may reßect worsening labour market
position and income development of those having no training.
Income
In the Þrst period there is 22 % and in the latter period 24.7 % of respondents
who do not tell their incomes. In the Þrst period, belonging to any of the income
groups does not inßuence ones opinion on the government. In the latter period,
the eﬀects are signiÞcant but about the same size in each of the income groups.
5 Conclusion
This is the Þrst study on Finnish individual-level government approval data.
Our speciÞc aim is to complement the Finnish vote and approval literature with
information that can be acquired only by applying individual-level data. We
analyze the inßuence of local unemployment, political orientation and socio-
economic background on the individual citizens government approval in the
1990s. Diverging economic development between and within regions and groups
led us to assume divergent behavior also with respect to the government. The
period under study covers years of the rightist coalition from 1991 to 1995 and
the years of the almost-all-inclusive rainbow coalition from 1995 to 2001. Thus,
the models are estimated for each of the government type separately.
Several aspects of our Þndings complement the existing evidence on both the
depression and the Finnish voting and approval behavior. We Þnd that during
the incumbency of the right government (1991-95), a high local unemployment
decreases ones likelihood of approving of the government. For the latter part of
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the 1990s, the era of the multi-party coalition, the result is just the opposite. All
in all, from 1992 to 1995 the responsibility hypothesis does not get support, but
from 1996 to 2001 it does. In addition, we document the inter-regional approval
diﬀerences without a direct connection to the local unemployment. Overall, the
government approval in diﬀerent provinces reßects the long-standing regional
divide in the party support. These results are clearly aﬀected by the dominant
position of the Centre Party in the Northern and Eastern provinces.
Expectably, ones political orientation drives the government approval de-
cision. Incumbency of the respondents last voted for party expectably in-
creases the likelihood of government support. Class dealignment is obvious
in our results, since only the farmers and the blue-collar workers approval pat-
tern slightly resembles the class-based support. Remarkable though is that the
class-based behavior occurs as non-support, i.e. as disapproval of the right gov-
ernment (blue-collars) or of the SDP lead government (farmers). From 1996 to
2001, the male respondents likelihood of approval is signiÞcantly lower for those
having no-training, whereas, among the female respondents the lower approval
likelihood is connected to high education. In the whole period the academic
women, and from 1996 to 2001 also the polytechnic women are less likely to
approve of the government. These men and women groups are deÞnitely not
similar, although they have the higher likelihood of disapproval in common. We
suggests that these groups either concretely face or are conscious of their risks
of being less-well-oﬀ. For the man group the risks consist of weak job market
position, unemployment, poverty and becoming estranged from the society. The
women group is probably aware of the challenges related to single-parenthood
and the relatively weakened position of single-parent families in the 1990s. Our
suggestion is in line with the international evidence of womens increased like-
lihood of disapproving the social transfer cutbacks.
In a country where the regional diﬀerences in party support are strong one
should expect controversial results while applying aggregate popularity and na-
tional unemployment and individual level approvals and local unemployment.
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Appendix 1
Survey Variables
These opinion polls by Gallup Finland are originally not designed for aca-
demic purposes. Although they are conducted biannually starting in 1985, I
was not able get all the material collected so far. Thus, this study includes 15
surveys from Spring 1992 to Autumn 2001, excluding polls of Spring 1995 and
Autumns 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998. Not all the surveys include all the ques-
tions which limits the setting of the research questions. Nevertheless, this is a
valuable source when we are interested in the factors aﬀecting the government
support on the individual-level. The recorded background variables oﬀer much
information on the respondents living circumstances. The interviews were done
over the phone and each poll includes 900-1500 respondents. Below is the list-
ing and deÞnitions of the variables used in this study. Usually, Gallup Finlands
original answer scaling has several options. For purpose of this study the scal-
ing is in many cases simpliÞed. Details on the variables drawn from the Gallup
Finland surveys are as follows.
1. GENDER male=0, female=1.
2. AGE The respondents are asked their age in years. Then the answer is
classiÞed to a 7-point scale. This is changed into an increasing scale of 5
points: under 25, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64, over 65.
3. EDUCATION Due to the changes in the education system over the years,
the pollster has used diﬀerent coding conventions. Original coding has
been slightly changed. The basic idea in re-coding is as follows: 1 = no
professional training (elementary school), 2 = vocational school or ap-
prenticeship training, 3 = matriculation exam or polytechnic degrees, 4 =
academic degrees, 0= other.
5. INCOME Both in the polls and in the oﬃcial statistics information
on gross incomes is collected by households. Gallup asks the respondent
his/her households gross income class. The original scales that Gallup
uses diﬀer a lot from poll to poll. For that reason it is impossible to
construct any other than the following division: less than middle income,
middle income, more than middle income. First, the reported income
classes are converted into 2001 prices. Second, the middle income for each
year is checked in the yearly income statistics by Statistics Finland. The
category including the middle income is entitled to middle income (2), all
observations below it to below average (1) and the rest to above average
(3) or no answer (0).
6. SOCIO-OCCUPATIONAL GROUP This variable is a result of combining
several questions. The aim is to categorize the occupational status of
the household in which the respondent is living. We apply the following
Gallups questions: 1. What is your occupation? 2. Are you yourself the
primary breadwinner in your household? 3. What is the occupation of
the primary breadwinner in your household? We classify the occupational
status of the household according to its main breadwinner. Alternatives
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for the occupational status are: farmer, entrepreneur, leading position or
white collar, blue collar, pensioner, student, other (includes stay-at-home
moms and dads).
7. LSTATUS This variable tells the respondents labor market status. Origi-
nal codes employed, unemployed, for other reasons outside the labor force,
no answer.
8. LCYCLE What is the phase of the life cycle you are living at the moment?
live with your parents, live alone/single, with a spouse, with spouse and
kids, single parent, other, no answer. Recorded only for the last few years.
9. REGION Gallup asks in which municipal the respondent is living. Gallup
codes municipals using the Finnish municipal coding practice. When those
codes are known it is easy to construct diﬀerent regional units. Here
we have applied NUTS3 division, which is close to the Finnish provinces
(Åland excluded): Uusimaa, Varsinais-Suomi, Satakunta, Häme, Pirkan-
maa, Kaakkois-Suomi, Etelä-Savo, Pohjois-Savo, Pohjois-Karjala, Keski-
Suomi, Etelä-Pohjanmaa, Pohjanmaa, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa, Kainuu, Lappi.
10. GOVERNMENT APPROVAL How content you are with the government
lead by Prime Minister N.N.? Very, quite, both and, not quite, not at all,
no answer. These answer options are combined to result a digital scale for
positive and negative answers. Dont know and no answer -answers are
deleted.
11. PRIME MINISTERS APPROVAL RATE Do you approve the way N.N.
is handling his job as the Prime Minister? Very much, quite much, both
and, not quite, not at all, no answer. These answer options are combined
to result a digital scale for positive and negative answers.
12. PRESIDENTS APPROVAL RATE Do you approve the way N.N. is han-
dling his/her job as the President? Very much, quite much, both and, not
quite, not at all, no answer. These answer options are combined to result
a digital scale for positive and negative answers.
13. VOTE INTENTION If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which
partys or other groups candidate would you voter for? Socialdemo-
cratic party (SDP), Centre Party (CENT), National Coalition Party (NC),
Left Alliance (LA), Green League (GL), Swedish Speaking Peoples Party
(SSPP), Christdemocratic Party (CD), Other, No answer or dont know.
Other Variables
In addition to the variable above, the following variable were added to the
data set.
1. TIME To be able to identify separately each poll, the time variable is
included. It is a dummy variable. Its abbreviation is a combination of
the polling time (2 letters) and polling year (2 digits), for example a poll
conducted in the Spring 1992 is coded as Sp92 where Sp= Spring and
92=1992. For Autumn 2000 the code is Au00.
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2. GOVT2 is a dummy variable applied in the latter periods regressions to
separate the second government period (starting in 1999) from the Þrst.
3. LOCAL UNEMPLOYMENT (LU) Monthly municipal unemployment rates
are collected by Ministry of Labour. Provincial unemployment rates are
calculated as the weighted average of municipal rates. Applied weight
is the number of labor force in municipal. There are two lags used for
the variable, one month and two months. One month lag applied, unless
otherwise indicated.
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Appendix 2
Table 1. Parameter coeﬃcients behind the marginal eﬀects in Table 6 in the
text.
1992-95 [std] 1995-01 [std]
Poll Au92/Sp97 -0.17* [0.09] 0.2* [0.08]
Au93/Au97 -0.1 [0.09] 0.17* [0.08]
Sp93/Au98 -0.16 [0.09] 0.25** [0.08]
Sp94/Sp99 -0.06 [0.09] 0.03 [0.08]
Au99 0.16* [0.08]
Sp00 0.17* [0.08]
Sp01 0.04 [0.08]
Au01 0.23** [0.08]
Govt2 0.75** [0.08]
Regiona Vars.Suomi -0.13 [0.11] -0.15* [0.07]
Satakunta -0.09 [0.13] -0.22* [0.09]
Häme 0.17 [0.12] -0.22** [0.07]
Pirkanmaa -0.02 [0.12] -0.22** [0.07]
Kymi -0.004 [0.13] -0.28** [0.08]
E-Savo 0.18 [0.15] -0.25** [0.10]
P-Savo 0.13 [0.14] -0.18* [0.08]
P-Karjala -0.09 [0.15] -0.34** [0.10]
K-Suomi 0.48** [0.13] -0.39** [0.08]
E-Pohjanmaa -0.19 [0.13] -0.39** [0.09]
Pohjanmaa 0.39** [0.16] -0.25** [0.10]
Oulu -0.03 [0.12] -0.27** [0.08]
Kainuu -0.29 [0.34] -0.74** [0.14]
Lappi 0.15 [0.14] -0.40** [0.09]
Genderb Female 0.01 [0.05] 0.03 [0.04]
Agec 18-24 -0.17 [0.12] 0.43** [0.10]
25-34 -0.33** [0.11] 0.05 [0.08]
35-49 -0.36** [0.09] -0.06 [0.07]
50-64 -0.29** [0.09] 0.05 [0.06]
Notes: Baseline categories for a Uusimaa, b men, c 65+, d other, e student,
other, f dont tell, g other parties. *(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%)
risk level.
111
Table 1 continues. Parameter coeﬃcients behind the marginal eﬀects in
Table 6 in the text..
1992-95 [std] 1995-01 [std]
Educationd Notraining -0.19 [0.30] -0.49* [0.20]
Vocational -0.19 [0.11] -0.11 [0.07]
Polytechnic -0.16 [0.10] -0.15* [0.07]
Academic -0.26** [0.12] -0.17* [0.07]
Socioe Farmer 0.29 [0.16] -0.43** [0.11]
Entrepreneur -0.18 [0.14] 0.003 [0.09]
White-collar -0.1 [0.11] 0.05 [0.08]
Blue-collar -0.36** [0.11] -0.04 [0.07]
Pensioner 0.03 [0.12] 0.03 [0.09]
Incomef Below-mid 0.007 [0.11] -0.16* [0.06]
Mid 0.03 [0.07] -0.16** [0.05]
Above-mid -0.02 [0.11] -0.19** [0.06]
Voted forg SDP -0.28** [0.08] 0.97** [0.05]
NC 0.77** [0.09] 0.63** [0.05]
CENT 1.46** [0.08] -0.42** [0.05]
LEFT -0.46** [0.15] -0.05 [0.09]
GREEN -0.32** [0.12] 0.07 [0.08]
Labour Employed -0.03 [0.67]
marketh Unemployed -0.07 [0.42]
Notes: Baseline categories for a Uusimaa, b men, c 65+, d other, e student,
other, f dont tell, g other parties, h outside labour force. NC (National Coali-
tion), SDP (Social Democratic Party), CENT (Finnish Centre Party), LA (Left
Alliance), GREEN (Green League). *(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%)
risk level.
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Table 2. Marginal eﬀects within gender groups.
1992-95 1992-95
Male Female
Poll Au92/Sp96 -0.06 -0.11*
Au93/Sp97 -0.07 -0.15*
Sp93/Au97 -0.1* -0.11*
Sp94/Au98 -0.06 -0.03
Agea 18-24 -0.05 -0.09
25-34 -0.14** -0.1*
35-49 -0.12** -0.13**
50-64 -0.1* -0.11*
Educationb Notraining -0.2 0.04
Vocational -0.04 -0.1
Polytechnic -0.03 -0.08
Academic -0.03 -0.14**
Socioc Farmer 0.06 0.13
Entrepreneur -0.08 -0.05
White-collar -0.05 -0.02
Blue-collar -0.11* -0.12*
Pensioner 0.04 0.07
Incomed Below-mid -0.00 0.01
Mid 0.01 0.03
Above-mid 0.02 -0.03
Voted fore SDP -0.04 -0.13**
NC 0.3** 0.34**
CENT 0.55** 0.50**
LA -0.09 -0.19*
LU 0.007 0.009
Notes: Baseline categories for a 65+, b other, c student, other, d dont tell, e
other parties. NC (National Coalition), SDP (Social Democratic Party), CENT
(Finnish Centre Party), LA (Left Alliance), GREEN (Green League). *(**)=
statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
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Table 3. Marginal eﬀects within gender groups.
1995-01 1995-01
Male Female
Polls Sp97 0.05 0.08
Au97 -0.04 0.1*
Au98 0.01 0.05
Sp99 -0.04 0.02
Au99 -0.02 0.1*
Sp00 0.08
Au00 -0.09*
Sp01 -0.04 -0.00
Au01 -0.06 0.14**
Govt2 0.27** 0.23**
Agea 18-24 0.13* 0.22**
25-34 0.007 0.04
35-49 -0.03 -0.01
50-64 0.04 0.00
Educationb Notraining -0.21* -0.13
Vocational -0.02 -0.04
Polytechnic -0.02 -0.08*
Academic -0.03 -0.10**
Socioc Farmer -0.18** -0.14**
Entrepreneur -0.006 -0.03
White-collar 0.003 0.03
Blue-collar -0.04 -0.003
Pensioner -0.02 0.03
Incomed Below-mid -0.03 -0.11**
Mid -0.04 -0.09**
Above-mid -0.02 -0.13**
Notes: Baseline categories for a 65+, b other, c student, other, d dont tell,
e other parties. *(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
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Table 3 continues. Marginal eﬀects within gender groups.
1995-01 1995-01
Voted fore SDP 0.37** 0.36**
NC 0.24** 0.26**
CENT -0.17** -0.15**
LEFT 0.01 0.06
Local LU -0.02** -0.01**
N 3201 2899
pseudo R2 0.17 0.16
log likelihood -1841.72 -1684.22
Notes:Baseline categories for a 65+, b other, c student, other, d dont tell, e
other parties. NC (National Coalition), SDP (Social Democratic Party), CENT
(Finnish Centre Party), LA (Left Alliance), GREEN (Green League). *(**)=
statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
Table 4. LR-test results, the disclosed variable listed.
Variable 1992-95 1996-01
Gender 0.03 0.62
Age 18.09** 37.65**
Education 6.13 10.40*
Socio 32.54** 27.29**
Income 0.19 14.73**
Voted for 547.69** 694.05**
LU 2.79 40.89**
Region 33.47** 62.76**
Govt2 54.32**
Lstatus 0.65
One variable group at a time is disclosed from model (restricted model).
The value of the likelihood function of the restricted model is then compared
with the respective one from the unrestricted model. The test statistic follows
χ2 distribution. *(**)= statistically signiÞcant at 5% (1%) risk level.
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